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Abstract
We argue that all gradable expressions in natural language obey a principle
that we call Comparability: if x and y are both F to some degree, then either
x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely
rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been
claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Compar-
ability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns of inference that
seem manifestly valid. We reply to some influential arguments against Com-
parability, raise and reject some new arguments, and draw out some surprising
implications of Comparability for debates concerning preference and credence.
1 The thesis of comparability
Our topic is the logic of comparative constructions: paradigmatically, the comparative forms
of adjectives (‘F-er’ or ‘more F’) and the equative form (‘[at least] as F as’).
∗Thanks to Johann Frick, Jeremy Goodman, Ben Holguin, Ankit Kansal, Harvey Lederman, Ofra
Magidor, Matt Mandelkern, Ralph Wedgwood, Alexis Wellwood, Timothy Williamson, Juhani Yli-
Vakkuri, and Snow Zhang.
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To help make the case that there is a subject matter here to be investigated, we list some
relatively uncontroversial examples of valid schemas involving these constructions.
Restricted Reflexivity If x is at least as F as y, then x is at least as F as x and y is
at least as F as y.
Comparative/Equative x is F-er than y if and only if x is at least as F as y and y
is not at least as F as x.
Equative/Comparative x is at least as F as y if and only if either x is F-er than y
or x and y are equally F.
Transitivity If x is at least as F as y and y is at least as F as z, x is at least as F as z.
Monotonicity If x is F and y is at least as F as x, then y is F.
We take all these schemas to be valid in the sense that their instances always express
necessary truths, so long as any ambiguity or context-sensitivity they may harbor is
resolved uniformly.1 We are not committing ourselves to their having any such disputed
status as analyticity. And while we will be taking their validity for granted here, on the
grounds that anyone who denied it would be unlikely to agree with the more controversial
claim that we will be focusing on, we regard this as a matter of legitimate and genuine
philosophical debate. Transitivity in particular has been vocally disputed by Rachels
(1998) and Temkin (2012), who have given much-discussed arguments that there are cases
where one thing is better than a second and the second is better than some third thing
without the first thing being better than the third thing.2 Nevertheless, our attitude is
1For this notion of validity, see Dorr (2014).
2In the literature on “comparative probability”, it is—surprisingly—occasionally taken for gran-
ted that Transitivity (or rather, a minor grammatical generalisation of it) fails for ‘at least as
confident’ when the domain includes irrational people. For example, Hawthorne (2009, p. 53)
writes down a formal principle that he glosses in English as “if α is at least as confident that A as
that B, and α is at least as confident that B as that C, then α is at least as confident that A as that C”,
and remarks that “Read this way, α is clearly supposed to be a logically ideal agent”. We speculate
that this is because of the tendency in this literature to equate ‘α is at least as confident that A
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that the instances of Transitivity are on an altogether firmer footing than the premises
that philosophers like Rachels and Temkin appeal to in arguing against them, or indeed
than all but the blandest and least controversial claims about the relative goodness of any
specific things. We think it would be methodologically appropriate for philosophers to
treat these general schemas, like other familiar laws of logic, as firm constraints on their
theorising about more specific matters.3
The case for the validity of the schemas is based on certain ingrained patterns of usage.
For example, one consequence of the validity of Comparative/Equative is that sentences
of the form ‘x is F-er than y and y is F-er than x’ are like sentences of the form ‘x is F and x is
not F’ in being necessarily false on any uniform interpretation. And indeed, our treatment
of such sentences is analogous in revealing ways—just as we would react to ‘The soup
is good and also not good’ by looking for plausible non-uniform interpretations where
the two ‘good’s mean different things, we would likewise react to ‘The soup is better
than the dessert, but the dessert is also better than the soup’ by looking for non-uniform
interpretations of the two ‘better than’s.
Although our schemas involve just a few specific syntactic constructions involving
gradable adjectives and present-tense verbs, they admit several natural syntactic gener-
alisations, which we can harmlessly treat as if they were instances of the schemas, since
they are valid if the original schemas are. First: some comparative adjectives take an
“internal argument”. For example, ‘close’, ‘fond’, and ‘confident’ normally appear in the
constructions ‘close to x’, ‘fond of x’, and ‘confident that P’. Any case for the validity of,
say, Transitivity will surely carry over to to its natural generalisations for adjectives with
internal arguments, such as:
as that B’ with something like ‘α judges that it is at least as probable that A as that B’, for which
transitivity is prima facie implausible. We will have more to say about this in the final paragraph
of section 7.
3Against the view that Transitivity is part of the logic of gradable adjectives, Temkin (2012,
p. 495) insists that views that violate Transitivity “represent substantive normative positions” (em-
phasis his). We agree; we just think they are incorrect (see, e.g., Nebel 2018, Pummer 2017). We
emphatically reject the assumption that logical disputes must be non-substantive.
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(1) If x is at least as fond of x′ as y is of y′, and y is at least as fond of y′ as z is of z′,
then x is at least as fond of x′ as z is of z′.
Second: while our schemas are in the present tense and indicative mood, they have natural
analogues for other patterns of tense and moods, including those in which the verb in the
comparative clause differs in tense or mood from the main verb:
(2) If y is at least as hungry now as x was at sunrise and z will be at least as hungry at
sunset as y is now, then z will be at least as hungry at sunset as x was at sunrise.
Third, the schemas extend naturally to comparative constructions not based on adjectives.
For example, Transitivity has natural analogues for adverbs, verbs, and nouns (Fleisch-
hauer 2016, Nicolas 2010):
(3) If x is campaigning at least as effectively as y and y is campaigning at least
effectively as z, then x is campaigning at least as effectively as z,
(4) If x likes x′ at least as much as y likes y′ and y likes y′ at least as much as z likes z′,
then x likes x′ at least as much as z likes z′,
(5) If John had at least as much fun as Mary and Mary had at least as much fun as
Rover, then John had at least as much fun as Rover.
Subsuming these different forms under unified explanatory generalizations would require
a fully general semantic analysis of comparative constructions, which we will not be trying
to provide (see Wellwood 2019). Nevertheless, in what follows we will take it for granted
that if any of the schemas to be considered is valid, its generalizations along the above
lines are valid as well.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we are ready to state our thesis, which is that
the following schema is valid:
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Comparability If x is at least as F as x and y is at least as F as y, then either x is
at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x.4
Note that given Restricted Reflexivity, the antecedent of Comparability is equivalent to the
more cumbersome, but perhaps less odd-sounding, ‘either x is at least as F as something
or something is at least as F as x, and either y is at least as F as something or something is
at least as F as y’.
As with the schemas considered earlier, we intend this claim of validity to apply not
just to sentences that are strictly speaking instances of the schema, but to various natural
syntactic generalisations, e.g.
(6) If x is at least as confident that P as x is that P, and y is at least as confident that Q
as y is that Q, then either x is at least as confident that P as y is that Q, or y is at
least as confident that Q as x is that P.
(7) If x was at least as hungry at sunset as x was at sunset and y will be at least as
hungry at sunrise as y will be at sunrise, then either x was at least as hungry at
sunset as y will be at sunrise or y will be at least as hungry at sunrise as x was at
sunset.
(8) If x likes x′ at least as much as x likes x′ and y likes y′ at least as much as y likes y′,
then either x likes x′ at least as much as y likes y′ or y likes y′ at least as much as x
likes x′.5
4Relations with the property that, whenever x and y are in the field of R, either xRy or yRx, are
sometimes called “complete”; other names for this property include “totality”, “connectedness”,
and “connexitity”. To avoid multiplying terminology unnecessarily, we will characterize such
relations as “satisfying Comparability,” even though strictly speaking Comparability is a natural
language schema and not a property of relations.
5A complication: some sentences that might seem like natural extensions of Comparability
involve an implicit generic element, which might arguably make for invalidity. For example,
suppose that when Amanda and Bob go on hikes, Amanda spends half the time walking slower
than Bob and the other half of the time walking faster than Bob. One might argue that ‘Amanda
walks at least as fast as Bob’ and ‘Bob walks at least as fast as Amanda’ are both false in this situation,
despite the obvious truth of ‘Amanda walks at least as fast as Amanda’ and ‘Bob walks at least as
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We can harmlessly treat sentences like these as honorary instances of Comparability, since
it would be completely implausible to suppose that they are invalid if it is valid.6
We state Comparability in conditional form rather than just endorsing its consequent
because we do not want to be committed either way as regards the truth of odd disjunctions
like (9) and (10):
(9) Either the square root of two is at least as tall as the Eiffel Tower, or the Eiffel Tower
is at least as tall as the square root of two.
(10) Either my left arm is at least as expensive as this laptop, or this laptop is at least
as expensive as my left arm.
fast as Bob’. The same issue can arise even for instances of Comparability proper, when the present-
tense ‘is’ is given a habitual reading: understood in this way, ‘Amanda is at least as happy as Bob’
and ‘Bob is at least as happy as Amanda’ are both arguably false if Amanda is happier half the
time and less happy the other half of the time. Any reasonable account of habituals should be able
to explain such exceptions in a way that is compatible with the validity of Comparability (and its
extensions) on non-habitual readings: presumably, the habitual interpretation involves something
analogous to an ‘at most times’ quantifier taking scope over each disjunct. Since opposition to
Comparability in the literature is not driven by habitual readings, we will set them aside in what
follows. Thanks to REFERENCE DELETED FOR BLIND REVIEW for discussion of this issue.
6One possible generalization that we are inclined to resist is the analogue of Comparability for
comparisons involving distinct adjectives:
Cross-Adjectival Comparability If x is F to some degree and y is G to some degree, then
either x is at least as F as y is G, or y is at least as G as x is F.
Some instances of this schema, involving pairs of adjectives which “correspond to the same scale”—
e.g., ‘tall’ and ‘wide’—sound fine. But, for typical arbitrary pairs of adjectives, cross-adjectival
comparisons are hard to interpret. For example, ‘He is as old as she is heavy’ sounds bizarre.
And analogues for comparative constructions not involving adjectives—e.g., ‘I had as much fun
as you had coffee’—sound even worse. This seems like prima facie reason not to count Cross-
Adjectival Comparability as valid. True, we are often not that bad at coming up with meanings
for cross-adjectival comparisons—e.g., ‘You are at least as beautiful as I am clever’. But following
most of those who have discussed this phenomenon (Cresswell 1976, p. 282; Kennedy 1999, §3.2)
we are inclined to think that sensible interpretations of such sentences require invoking some
additional, non-automatic pragmatic mechanism. (Bale (2008), by contrast, gives a semantics in
which ordinary comparisons using single adjectives (at least those like ‘beautiful’ that are not
associated with any “system of measurement”) are treated in exactly the same way as ‘You are
more beautiful than I am clever’. Given this view, it seems that Cross-Adjectival Comparability
would have to be classified as valid if Comparability is. This surprising result would be tenable
only if the oddity of many of its instances could be explained away, and it is not clear that Bale has
the resources for such an explanation.)
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Given Comparability, we are free to say that (9) and (10) are false, so long as we say that
(11) and (12) are also false:
(11) The square root of two is at least as tall as itself.
(12) My left arm is as expensive as itself.
It is not obvious that we should want to say that any of these sentences are false. They are
certainly quite odd, but this oddity can arguably be adequately explained by appeal to
the fact that they have false presuppositions (as witness the fact that they remain odd when
embedded under negation or turned into questions), and on some views of presupposition,
true sentences can have false presuppositions. So, the claim that the consequent of
Comparability is already valid is not a complete non-starter. But from our point of view,
all that matters is that the central reasons why one might want to deny the truth of (9) and
(10) also apply to (11) and (12), so whatever we decide to say about such sentences, they
will not threaten Comparability.
To avoid awkwardness, we will stipulatively use ‘x is F to some degree’ to mean that x
is at least as F as itself.7 This would not look very plausible if it were intended as an account
of the ordinary English meaning of ‘to some degree’. (In the ordinary sense, ‘Having one’s
foot broken is pleasant to some degree’ seems false, but ‘Having one’s foot massaged is
more pleasant than having it broken’ seems true, which given Comparative/Equative and
Restricted Reflexivity means that ‘Having one’s foot broken is at least as pleasant as itself’
must also be true.) Two further stipulations will also be convenient: we will use ‘x and
y are comparable with respect to being F’ to mean ‘Either x is at least as F as y or y is at
least as F as x’, and ‘x and y are incomparable with respect to being F’ to mean ‘x and y
are both F to some degree but are not comparable with respect to being F’. Comparability
can be restated using these definitions as ‘No two things are incomparable with respect
to being F’. Again, these stipulations are not supposed to reflect the ordinary meanings
7This restricts our attention to what axiologists might call ‘bearers’ of F-ness, in a way that
(unlike the jargon of ‘bearers’) naturally extends to the syntactic generalizations of Comparability.
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of ‘comparable’ and ‘incomparable’. (In the ordinary sense, ‘x and y are incomparable’
seems compatible with, and indeed tends to suggest, ‘either x is incomparably better than
y or y is incomparably better than x’, which in turn evidently entails that ‘x and y are
comparable’ is true in our technical sense. In the opposite direction, Chang (2002) argues
that there are pairs of items that are incomparable in our sense, but that all of these pairs
are comparable in the ordinary sense.)
To help bring out what would be involved in accepting or rejecting Comparability, it
may be helpful to consider some closely related schemas which it entails given the less
controversial validities listed earlier. (Some of the arguments for Comparability we will
be giving below can also be adapted to provide direct support for these schemas.) First,
given Comparative/Equative, Comparability is equivalent to the more natural-sounding
Exclusive Comparability If x and y are both F to some degree, then either x is at
least as F as y or y is F-er than x.
And given Equative/Comparative, Exclusive Comparability is in turn equivalent to:
Trichotomy If x and y are both F to some degree, then either x is F-er than y, y is
F-er than x, or x and y are equally F.
Finally, given the combination of Transitivity and Comparative/Equative, Comparability
implies:
Negative Transitivity If x is not F-er than y, and y is not F-er than z, and y is F
to some degree, then x is not F-er than z.8
8Proof: Suppose the antecedent of Negative Transitivity is true but the consequent is false: x
is F-er than z. Then x and z, as well as y, are F to some degree. So by Exclusive Comparability,
y is at least as F as x and z is at least as F as y. So by transitivity, z is at least as F as x, which by
Comparative/Equative is incompatible with our assumption x being F-er than z.
One might wonder whether there are any plausible conditions under which Negative Transitivity
is equivalent to Comparability. The following would do the trick:
If either x is F-er than everything y is F-er than, or everything F-er than x is F-er than y,
and x and y are both F to some degree, then x is at least as F as y.
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Recall that given Restricted Reflexivity, ‘is F to some degree’ can be replaced in any of
these principles with either ‘is at least as F as something’ or ‘is such that something is at
least as F as it’.
One final caveat: some philosophers reject (or at least decline to accept) the validity
of instances of the Law of the Excluded Middle, ‘Either P or it is not the case that P’.
Particularly germane in the present context are views according to which the vagueness
of P can make instances of this schema unacceptable. These philosophers have reason to
be suspicious of Comparability and many of its consequences. For example, they should
not accept the validity of Exclusive Comparability. For the combination of Exclusive
Comparability with the seemingly valid ‘If y is F-er than x, x is not F-er than y’ seems to
imply ‘If x and y are both F to some degree, then either x is F-er than y or x is not F-er than
y.’ But it would be strange for anyone who did not accept Excluded Middle to regard this
scheme as valid, since the comparative forms of adjectives are often vague. And since
Exclusive Comparability follows rather unproblematically from Comparative/Equative
and Comparability, any doubts about Excluded Middle should carry over to one or both
of these schemas as well. Since a defence of Excluded Middle would take us too far afield
from our topic, we will here simply assume its validity. For a variety of views about
vagueness that are compatible with the validity of Excluded Middle, see Lewis 1969, Fine
1975, Williamson 1994, Keefe 2000, Graff 2000, Dorr 2003, and Bacon 2018.9
However, this would be false if it could happen that there are at least two things that are F to some
degree and any two things which are both F to some degree are incomparable. And there is no
obvious reason for opponents of Comparability not to allow for such possibilities.
9Comparability has a variant not involving disjunction, which is not obviously affected by
doubts related to Excluded Middle:
Conditional Comparability If x and y are both F to some degree, and x is not at least as
F as y, then y is at least as F as y.
In a non-classical setting like that of Field (2003), where Conditional Comparability does not imply
Comparability, Conditional Comparability may retain much of the philosophical significance of
Comparability, and be supported by variants of some of the arguments which we will be presenting
below. We will not however attempt to track which of our arguments could be adapted to any
particular non-classical background logic.
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Our arguments for Comparability will be presented in §3. First, in §2, we will discuss
some arguments against Comparability that have been influential especially in the ethics
literature (where there has, unsurprisingly, been a special focus on the adjective ‘good’).
We will reply to these arguments in §4, and to some other arguments against Comparability
in §5. §6 and §7 will combine Comparability with some further premises to argue for
certain unpopular claims about preference and credence. §8 concludes.
2 The debate about comparability
Comparability seems to be taken for granted in most contemporary work by semanticists
working on gradable adjectives.10 However, we are not aware of explicit arguments for
Comparability in the linguistics literature, and it is not obvious how indispensable the
assumptions that lead to its validity are in the linguists’ accounts of the phenomena they
are primarily concerned to explain.
Many philosophers, by contrast, either argue explicitly against certain instances of
Comparability, or rely on such failures in accounts of other phenomena, in a way that
could easily be retooled as an abductive argument against Comparability.11 Some of these
10See, e.g., Kennedy (1999), Schwarzschild (2008), and Wellwood (2019). Klein (1980) develops
a trivalent semantics which posits a distinctive category of ‘nonlinear’ adjectives for which it can
happen that both ‘a is at least as F as b’ and ‘b is at least as F as b’ are neither true nor false; but he
uses supervaluationist machinery in evaluating complex sentences in such a way that instances of
Comparability will always come out true. The earlier literature is less committed: Wheeler (1972)
presents a kind of analysis for comparatives which is neutral not only about Comparability but
about Transitivity, and sees the desire for a semantic theory that settles such questions as “strategic
and theoretical mistake” that “turns semantics into physics” (319). (He does go on to suggest
that “the grammatical phenomenon of the ‘-er’ construction. . . serves as a notification that” the
relation in question is transitive, but makes no parallel suggestion about completeness.) Likewise,
Cresswell (1976) is explicitly neutral about comparability, and even suggests that “perhaps we
should even be liberal enough not to insist on transitivity and antisymmetry” for ‘F-er than’
(p. 266).
11Perhaps the most influential examples are Chang (2002) and Raz (1985). Examples related
to rational choice and preference include Handfield (2014), Hsieh (2005), Rabinowicz (2008), Ra-
binowicz (2012), Raz (1999), and Schoenfield (2014). Examples related to moral decision-making
include Hare (2016), Richardson (1994), and Sinnott-Armstrong (1985). Examples from population
ethics include Chang (2016), Frick (2017), Gustafsson (2019), Parfit (2016), Qizilbash (2007), Qiz-
ilbash (2018), and Rabinowicz (2009a). Examples from formal epistemology include R. Bradley
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arguments are highly specific to specific expressions of interest to some particular fields
of philosophy, and cannot be addressed in this paper. But it will be useful to consider
some particularly influential arguments against Comparability which, if successful, would
generalize to a wide class of comparative expressions. These arguments turn on the so-
called “multidimensionality” exhibited by many comparative expressions. For example,
in the case of ‘good’, it often seems deeply tendentious to characterise either of two things
as at least as good as the other, because each is better than the other in different respects,
and there seems to be no non-arbitrary basis for aggregating the different respects into a
single overall judgment. For example, according to Parfit (2016, p. 113),
When two painful ordeals differ greatly in both their length and their intensity,
there are no precise truths about whether, and by how much, one of these
pains would be worse. There is no scale on which we could weigh the relative
importance of intensity and length.
Sen (1997b, p. 5) makes a similar point about ‘more unequal than’:
Most statistical measures of the inequality level assume a high degree of meas-
urement. . . . It is, however, possible to argue that the implicit notion of inequal-
ity that we carry in our mind is, in fact, much less precise and may correspond
to an incomplete quasi-ordering. We may not indeed be able to decide whether
one distribution x is more or less unequal than another, but we may be able to
compare some other pairs perfectly well. The notion of inequality has many
aspects, and a coincidence of them may permit a clear ranking, but when these
different aspects conflict an incomplete ranking may emerge.
Earlier still, Keynes (1921, p. 31) gives a similar justification for putative counterexamples
to Comparability with respect to ‘probable’:
(2017), Hawthorne (2009), Kaplan (1996), Konek (2019), Schoenfield (2012), and Smith (2014). Am-
artya Sen in particular has utilized incomparability across a wide variety of domains, including
the theory of inequality, welfare aggregation, justice, and social and rational choice (Sen 1970, Sen
1980, Sen 1997a, Sen 1997b, Sen 2009).
11
Consider three sets of experiments, each directed towards establishing a gen-
eralisation. The first set is more numerous; in the second set the irrelevant
conditions have been more carefully varied; in the third case the generalisation
in view is wider in scope than in the others. Which of these generalisations
is on such evidence the most probable? There is, surely, no answer; there is
neither equality nor inequality between them. We cannot always weigh the
analogy against the induction, or the scope of the generalisation against the
bulk of the evidence in support of it.
We take it that Parfit, Sen, and Keynes are reasoning as follows. Consider a case in which
x and y are both F, but in quite different ways. If Comparability is true, then either one is
F-er than the other or they are equally F. Whichever it is, the comparison would have to be
explained by some particular way of weighing between the relevant dimensions of F. But
there is no reason to privilege any particular way of weighing between those dimensions.
We should therefore deny that one of the items must be at least as F as the other.
There are doubtless subtle differences between the ways in which our various authors
are thinking about this mode of argument, but we will lump them all together under
as “tradeoff arguments”. While not all comparative adjectives are subject to the kind of
multidimensionality that drives these arguments, a great many of them are: for example
one could easily run parallel arguments for ‘clever’, ‘funny’, ‘useful’, ‘hairy’, and ‘tidy’.12
Another kind of argument prominent in the axiological literature is the “argument
from small improvements”.13 Here, instead of citing the difficulties posed by tradeoffs
among dimensions in the same way to support all three of ‘x is not F-er than y’, ‘y is not F-er
than x’ and ‘x and y are not equally F’, we start with the first two of these claims (perhaps
motivated by thoughts about the difficulty of tradeoffs), and these claims are then used
12See Sassoon (2013) for some proposed diagnostics for multidimensional adjectives.
13The small improvement argument was first made, by De Sousa (1974), as an objection to the
completeness axiom of expected utility theory. The axiological version is pressed, most influen-
tially, Raz (1985).
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as premises in a more complicated argument for the third claim (of non-equality). Here is
an example from Chang (1998, pp. 23–24), based on Raz (1985):
Suppose we rationally judge that a particular career as a clarinetist is neither
better nor worse than a particular career as a lawyer, say, with respect to
goodness of careers. . . . We can improve the clarinetist career a little with
respect to goodness of careers, perhaps by increasing the salary by ten dollars.
Are we thereby compelled to judge that the improved music career is better
than the legal one? It seems rational to resist this conclusion. If it is rational,
then the original careers cannot be equally good, since if they were, a small
improvement in one must make it better than the other.
The general form of the argument can be reconstructed as follows:
(P1) x is not F-er than y and y is not F-er than x.
(P2) x+ is F-er than x.
(P3) x+ is not F-er than y.
(Conclusion) x is not at least as F as y and y is not at least as F as x.
This argument is valid given Transitivity and Comparative/Equative.14 So the challenge
is to find particular instances of x, y, and x+ for which all three premises are plausible.
As we saw in the quote from Chang, the strategy is to choose an x and y for which P1
is plausible not because of some very extensive similarities or some perfectly balanced
competing considerations, but because x and y differ along multiple relevant dimensions
in such a way that it would seem deeply tendentious to characterise either as F-er than
14Suppose for contradiction that either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. By P1,
each of x and y must at least as F as the other. But P2 implies that x+ is at least as F as x, so, by
Transitivity, x+ is at least as F as y. So the only way P3 could be true would be if y were also at
least as F as x+. But if this were the case, then by Transitivity, x would have to be at least as F as
x+, which is ruled out by P2.
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the other. We then choose an x+ that is similar to x but slightly improved along some
dimensions. This makes P2 plausible, while keeping the pattern of relations between x+
and y similar enough to the pattern of relations between x and y that insofar as that pattern
supports P1, it will provide a similar level of support to P3.
The small improvement argument is arguably an improvement over the tradeoff ar-
gument, since in the presence of the relevant kind of multidimensionality, the claim that
the relevant items are equally F seems less immediately repugnant than the claims to the
effect that one is F-er than the other.15
Like the tradeoff argument, the small improvement argument can be run for a very
broad range of adjectives. For example, Schoenfield (2012) gives a small improvement ar-
gument for the claim that there are not only possible counterexamples to Comparability for
‘confident’, but that there are people who should be (such that they are) counterexamples.
Having described a case where you have masses of disparate evidence pointing to each of
two suspects in a murder, she first elicits the judgment that you could rationally be neither
more nor less confident that Smith is the murderer than that Jones is; she then argues that
if you were rational and were in this state, you should continue to be in the state even
if you acquired a tiny bit more evidence that Smith was the murderer which made you
slightly more confident that Smith was the murderer and slightly less confident that Jones
was the murderer.
We will come back to the tradeoff and small improvement arguments in §4, after
we have laid out our positive case for Comparability; we will suggest that there are
good independent reasons for being suspicious of both arguments, so that overall the
considerations in favour of Comparability should be regarded as more compelling.
Despite the broad influence of tradeoff and small improvement arguments, philo-
sophers have certainly not been unanimously opposed to Comparability. Some have
defended the validity of Comparability for specific adjectives on specific interpretations:
15We will discuss why this should be in §4.
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for example, Regan (1997) appeals to requirements of practical reason to argue that Com-
parability holds for the specific sense of ‘good’ used by G. E. Moore. But there seems
to be only one widely discussed argument that might have some chance of supporting
Comparability in full generality, namely that of Broome (1997).
Broome’s strategy is to argue that that incomparability in any gradable adjective is
incompatible with vagueness. In doing so, he relies on the following “collapsing principle”
about vague comparatives: if y is not F-er than x and it is not determinately false that x
is F-er than y, then x is F-er than y.16 Unfortunately, if we assume with Broome that the
operator ‘it is not determinately false that. . . ’ is not logically redundant, this principle is
subject to counterexample. For example, suppose that we are in the process of enlarging a
statue that was originally made of a certain quantity of bronze, b; we have moulded a new
piece of bronze into the shape of a crown, which we are just in the process of soldering on
to the top of b. Let b+ be the larger quantity of bronze comprising b together with our new
bronze. Let’s suppose we are at a point in the process where it is neither determinately
true nor determinately false that the new bronze is part of the statue. (This assumption
should be acceptable to anyone who takes ‘it is not determinately false that. . . ’ to be
non-redundant.) Hence it is neither determinately true nor determinately false that the
statue is heavier than b, and also neither determinately true nor determinately false that b+
is heavier than the statue. But clearly, b is not heavier than the statue, and the statue is not
heavier than b+. Given two applications of Broome’s principle, we can derive from these
premises that the statue is heavier than b, and b+ is heavier than the statue. But we surely
should not be committed to this conclusion, given that we are committed to its being
neither determinately true nor determinately false. Indeed, it seems quite implausible:
it’s certainly not the case that only some of the new bronze is part of the statue.
There is a sizeable literature on Broome’s collapsing principle and how it might be
16Broome’s wording lacks the ‘determinately’; we find it hard not to read ‘not false that’ as
logically redundant.
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revised to avoid such counterexamples.17 Suffice it to say that principles in the vicinity
are highly controversial and, we believe, less independently plausible than Comparability
itself. We will not rely on them in what follows.
We know of no other explicit arguments in favour of the validity of Comparability. In
the next section we will supply several arguments, each of which appeals to some pattern
of inference which seems manifestly valid, but which would seem to be invalid if Com-
parability is. None of our arguments are very intricate; some are so simple that opponents
of Comparability may feel we are begging the question against them. Nevertheless, we
think there is value in simply laying out the appearances that favour Comparability, since
its opponents have not often acknowledged that there is even a prima facie case for its
validity. Even if our arguments are not decisive, we believe that it will not be an easy task
to provide an alternative, incomparability-friendly explanation of our data.
3 Arguing for Comparability
(i) ‘Not as F as’. Our first argument turns on the apparent validity of the following infer-
ence:
(13) Max’s room isn’t as tidy as Josh’s. So Josh’s room is tidier than Max’s.
The pattern is perfectly general: for any gradable adjective F, Not As F As seems intuitively
valid:
Not As F As x is not as F as y. So, y is F-er than x.
Indeed, the converse of Not As F As also seems valid: ‘x is not as F as y’ is intuitively
equivalent to ‘y is Fer than x’. The appearances here are just as strong for the paradigm
“multidimensional” adjectives where Comparability has been thought to fail as for other
17See Andersson (2014), Andersson and Herlitz (2018), Carlson (2004), Carlson (2013), Con-
stantinescu (2012), Elson (2014), Gustafsson (2013), Gustafsson (2018), Qizilbash (2007), and Ra-
binowicz (2009b).
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adjectives: for example, ‘Your favourite composer isn’t as good as mine’ seems inter-
changeable with ‘My favourite composer is better than yours’.
How should these appearances be explained? Here is what we propose. ‘As F as’
is truth-conditionally equivalent to ‘at least as F as’. As a result, given the validity of
Exclusive Comparability, Not As F As can be turned into a valid argument-schema by
adding an extra premise, ‘x and y are both at least as as F as themselves’. Now, in many
instances of Not As F As, this extra premise is an obvious necessary truth. For example, it
is presumably necessary that all rooms are as tidy as themselves, and that all composers
are at least as good as themselves. So in these cases, the appearance of validity can be
accepted at face value. However, this observation doesn’t take us far enough: Not As F
As seems like a valid form; and its instances seem valid even when there are no specific
grounds for assuming that the relevant objects are F to some degree. (For example, ‘The
thing he is thinking about isn’t as expensive as the thing she is thinking about’ seems to
entail ‘The thing she is thinking about is more expensive than the thing he is thinking
about’.) One could consider explaining this by endorsing the strengthened version of
Comparability that drops the ‘to some degree’ proviso. But this is not required: instead,
the sense of validity can be explained by positing that comparative sentences like ‘x is as
F as y’ carry a presupposition to the effect that x and y are both F to some degree (in our
stipulative sense of being at least as F as themselves). Such a presupposition would not
be surprising: in uttering ‘x is as F as y’ we are raising the question ‘How F are x and y?’, a
question that intuitively presupposes that x and y are F to some degree. It is characteristic
of presuppositions to “project through negation”: a sentence and its negation presuppose
the same things. So ‘x is not as F as y’ has a false presupposition in the case where one or
other of x and y is not F to any degree. Given Comparability, it follows that Not As F As
has the following status: whenever its premise neither entails nor presupposes anything
false, its conclusion neither entails nor presupposes anything false. Whether or not we
want to apply the technical term ‘valid’ to arguments with this status, it seems sufficient
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to account for the intuitive feeling of validity that arguments like (13) inspire: compare
‘Max doesn’t know that Sue is a spy; so not every spy is known by Max to be a spy’, or
‘Every animal I own is well-trained; so at least one animal I own is well-trained’.
Our explanation of the apparent validity of Not As F As relies on the thesis that ‘as F
as’ is equivalent to ‘at least as F as’. An apparent problem for this claim comes from the
fact that ‘x is as F as y’ often looks interchangeable with ‘x and y are equally F’, whereas
‘x is at least as F as y’ never does. But as Schwarzschild 2008 points out, the stronger
meaning associated with ‘x is as F as y’ looks to be an instance of the phenomenon of
scalar implicature, the same pragmatic process whereby ‘I ate most of the cake’ can be used
to mean ‘I ate most but not all of the cake’, or ‘You are allowed to type your essay’ can
be used to mean ‘You are allowed but not required to type your essay’. One hallmark of
scalar implicatures is that the “strengthened” meanings normally disappear in negative
environments: ‘I didn’t eat most of the cake’ won’t normally seem true if I ate all of it;
‘No students are allowed to type their essays’ won’t normally seem true if all students are
required to type their essays. As we have seen, ‘as F as’ behaves similarly. ‘x is not as F
as y’ wouldn’t normally seem true if x and y are not equally F because x is F-er than y.
Likewise, ‘No graduate student’s room is as tidy as Josh’s’ wouldn’t normally seem true
if no graduate student’s room is such that it and Josh’s are equally tidy but some of them
are tidier than Josh’s. The way ‘at least’ functions to block the strengthened meaning is
also seen in other cases of scalar implicature: compare ‘I at least ate most of the cake’; ‘You
are at least allowed to type your essay.’18
Could the apparent validity of (13) be explained without appealing to Comparability?
18If one rejected the appeal to scalar implicature, the obvious alternative would involve positing
a straightforward semantic ambiguity, whereby ‘x is as F as y’ has one meaning equivalent to ‘x
and y are equally F’ and another equivalent to ‘x as at least as F as y’. This less parsimonious view
could also be used, together with Comparability, to explain why arguments like (13) strike us as
valid, so long as we have some account of why we gravitate to the disambiguation that makes
them valid. Part of this could be a general charitable tendency to favour disambiguations that
make arguments presented as valid actually be valid, although there is surely more to it than that,
since the ‘equally F’ reading seems in general hard to access in negative (downward-entailing)
environments.
18
One idea is that ‘x is as F as y’ is equivalent, at least on one disambiguation, to ‘y is not
F-er than x’, or to ‘y is not F-er than x and x and y are both F to some degree’. But if
Comparability is rejected, these proposals conflict with the very plausible thesis that ‘as F
as’ is transitive on all of its disambiguations: ‘a is as F as b, and b is as F as c, but a is not
as F as c’ seems flatly inconsistent.
A more promising strategy for opponents of Comparability would be to appeal to
some pragmatic effect by which ‘Max’s room is not at tidy as Josh’s’ gets associated with
a meaning that strengthens its standard truth-condition by entailing that the rooms are
comparable (and hence that Josh’s room is tidier than Max’s). But such a strengthened
meaning could not be generated by any general pragmatic mechanism, since no comparable
strengthening is observed for other binary relations which uncontroversially do not obey
the analogue of Comparability. Consider parthood. There are some things x and y such
that x is not part of y and y is not part of x. But ‘not part of’ does not get pragmatically
strengthened in anything like the way we are considering for ‘not as tidy as’. There is no
temptation to hear the following argument as valid:
(14) My carburettor is not part of your computer. So your computer is part of my
carburettor.
So, it looks like the strategy we are considering would have to posit something distinctive
about the conventional meanings of comparatives to generate the needed strengthening.
The most obvious idea is to posit that ‘x is [at least] as F as y’ presupposes ‘either x is at least
as F as y or x is at least as F as y’. Given that presuppositions project through negation,
this posit will secure for Not As F As the very same status of “presuppositional validity”
that we have claimed for it.19
19Magidor (2013, p. 145, n. 46) considers (without endorsing) the similar idea that “‘x is smaller
than y’ triggers the presupposition that x and y are comparable in size”, as one possible account of
the oddity of ‘My table is[/is not] smaller than the number three’. In §5, we will be endorsing an
alternative account of the oddity of such sentences (one which Magidor also considers), in terms
of polysemy or context-sensitivity in comparatives like ‘smaller’.
19
Positing such a presupposition as a brute matter of lexical semantics seems worryingly
ad hoc: in general, the ordinary truth-conditional meanings of expressions seem to place
quite tight constraints on their presuppositions, even though there is no consensus about
what form these constraints take. We can also argue directly against the presupposition-
theoretic proposal, by pointing to various utterances which should, if it were true, strike
us as infelicitous or at least risky, on account of their strong presuppositions. Consider
polar questions, which have the same presuppositions as the corresponding declarative
sentences:
(15) Is your Ferrari parked in the garage?
—Why are you assuming I have a Ferrari?
We can use this as a test for views that posit nontrivial presuppositions. Our proposal
that ‘x is as F as y’ presupposes ‘x and y are both F to some degree’ (i.e. ‘x is as F as x and
y is as F as y’) seems to pass the test:
(16) Was the performance by the children’s choir as expensive as the wedding banquet?
—Why do you assume they were paid?20
But there is no hint that questions of the form ‘Is x as F as y?’ carry any non-trivial
presupposition about the relation between x and y that goes beyond the presupposition
that they are individually F to some degree:
(17) Is Max’s room as tidy as Josh’s room?
—? Why do you assume that one of their rooms was at least as tidy as the other?
Plausibly, every room is tidy to some degree. But if Comparability is false, one would
expect it to be pretty easy for a pair of rooms to be such that neither is at least as tidy as
20Examples like this suggest that ‘expensive’ carries some kind of presupposition, to the effect
that the relevant item was or could be bought. Whatever exactly this comes to, it presumably
entails (and might be argued to be equivalent to) being as expensive as oneself. For the difficulty
of pinning down precise presuppositions in such cases, see Magidor (2013, §4.2).
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the other. So unless we take the questioner in (17) to have some independent evidence
about what each of the rooms is like, it should seem like they are unjustifiably ruling out
a live scenario. But we have no sense that this is the case: (17) seems a perfectly innocent
question.
The point is especially forceful when we turn to sentences involving quantifiers, which
should (if ‘as F as’ carries a comparability presupposition but Comparability is false) have
strong presuppositions that we can often know to be false. Consider:
(18) Most composers aren’t as good as Beethoven.
(19) Are many contemporary cellists as talented as Pablo Casals was?
(20) I will buy an ice cream for everyone whose room is as tidy as Josh’s.
We should expect such sentences to carry universal presuppositions, just as ‘Most senior
managers drive their Ferraris to work’ carries the presupposition that every senior man-
ager has a Ferrari, and ‘Have many programmers stopped using Emacs?’ carries the
presupposition that all programmers used to use Emacs. So on the view that equat-
ives carry comparability presuppositions, (18)–(20) should presuppose, respectively, that
every composer is comparable in goodness to Beethoven; that every contemporary cellist
is comparable in talentedness to Casals; and that everyone’s room is comparable in tidi-
ness to Josh’s. And if Comparability fails, these presuppositions should seem tendentious
or even clearly false. But in fact these sentences are all perfectly felicitous for speakers
with no special evidence. So, there is an abundance of evidence against the thesis that
that ‘x is as F as y’ carries the comparability of x and y as a presupposition which is not
entailed by the presupposition that x and y are both F to some degree.
(ii) ‘No F-er’. Our second argument is based on the apparent validity of arguments like
the following:
(21) Max’s room is no tidier than Josh’s. So, Josh’s room is at least as tidy as Max’s.
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This certainly seems a good piece of reasoning. Since the appearances seem entirely
the same for any other comparative adjectives (including ‘good’ and other paradigms of
“multidimensionality”), it sees to us that its goodness is best explained by the view that
No F-er Than is valid:
No F-er Than If x and y are both F to some degree, and x is no F-er than y, then
y is at least as F as x.
The validity of No F-er Than can in turn be explained by appeal to Comparability and
Comparative/Equative, given the plausible further assumption that ‘no F-er than’ is truth-
conditionally equivalent to ‘not F-er than’.
Analogous to what we already saw in the case of Not As F As, the fact that (21) seems
valid despite not having ‘Max’s room and Josh’s room are both tidy to some degree’ in
the antecedent can plausibly be taken care of by invoking presuppositions. No F-er Than
is also analogous to Not As F As in that opponents of Comparability could attempt to
explain away the evidence for its validity by positing a comparability presupposition in
addition to the ‘F to some degree’ presupposition; but as we have discussed, standard
tests suggest that no such further presupposition exists.
The other obvious option is to accept the validity of No F-er Than, but reject the thesis
that ‘no F-er than’ is equivalent to ‘not F-er than’. But note that for the argument to go
through, it is enough that ‘x is no F-er than y’ follows from ‘x and y are both F to some
degree, and x is not F-er than y’. And it is very hard to see what more could reasonably
be required, given that ‘no F-er’ results from combining ‘F-er’ with the mass-quantifier
‘no’, which also occurs in other contexts like ‘There is no butter in the fridge’. Given the
validity of ‘If is not the case that there is butter in the fridge, there is no butter in the
fridge’, it is hard to see how any systemic semantic account of ‘no’ could avoid likewise
validating ‘If it is not the case that x is F-er than y, x is no F-er than y’.21
21If you are inclined to resist here, it might help to use ‘x is not at all F-er than y’ or ‘x isn’t any
F-er than y’ as a bridge.
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Admittedly, we do seem happier to accept ‘not F-er than’ than ‘no F-er than’ in some
circumstances, even when there is no doubt that the relevant items are F to some degree.
‘Beethoven is no better than Bach’ perhaps suggests more confidence in one’s musical
judgment than ‘Beethoven isn’t better than Bach’. But it does not seem promising to
explain this contrast by assigning ‘no F-er’ a special new kind of semantics that one could
not predict by thinking about the general behaviour of ‘no’ and ‘F-er’. We find it much
more likely that the contrast is a pragmatic one, related to whatever makes “wide scope”
negations often feel weaker than narrow-scope negations: e.g ‘He is not bald’ feel weaker
than ‘He is non-bald’, and ‘It’s not an issue’ feel weaker than ’It’s a non-issue’. For example,
we might want to say that wide-scope negations can, but narrow-scope negations cannot,
be pragmatically reinterpreted as “metalinguistic negation” (Horn 1985), rejecting some
other contemplated speech act rather than making an ordinary assertion.
(iii) ‘F things are F-er than non-F things’. Our third argument is based on the apparent
validity of the following piece of reasoning:
(22) Kara is healthy, and Sam is not healthy. So Kara is healthier than Sam.
Again, (22) seems like a good piece of reasoning for any comparative construction. Its
apparent validity is, we submit, best explained by the validity of the following schema
(which is a strengthening of Monotonicity, stated on page 2):
Strong Monotonicity If x is F and y is not F but y is F to some degree, then x is
F-er than y.22
22For similar principles, see Chisholm and Sosa (1966, p. 248) and Van Benthem (1982, p. 198).
Nebel (2018) states instances of Strong Monotonicity for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and observes that they
pose problems for incomparability in specific contexts, but fails to notice its more general implic-
ations. Flanigan and Halstead (2018) propose a similar “dyadic–monadic” principle to defend the
more limited claim that, given epistemicism about vagueness, options must be comparable.
Gustafsson (2019) rejects Strong Monotonicity for ‘good’ on the grounds that (i) something can
be incomparable to a “neutral” thing (he calls such things “undistinguished”) and (ii) anything
better than a neutral thing must be good. If x is neutral and y is incomparable to x (and thus
“undistinguished”), then y should also be incomparable to some x+ that is slightly better than
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Strong Monotonicity does not quite certify (22) as a valid argument, since it requires the
extra premise ‘Sam is healthy to some degree’. But it is obviously necessary that every
living creature is healthy to some degree (in our stipulative sense of being at least as
healthy as itself), and in considering (22) we naturally assume that ‘Sam’ is the name
of a living creatures (as opposed to, say, a number); so Strong Monotonicity is adequate
to explain why (22) seems cogent. Moreover, it is plausible that ‘F to some degree’ is
a presupposition of an unmodified adjective F, and hence also of its negation, so that
arguments like (22) will have the good status of “presuppositional validity” discussed
earlier.
One might reject Strong Monotonicity on the grounds that ‘This mouse is big, and
that elephant is not big (but is big to some degree)’ does not entail ‘This mouse is bigger
than that elephant’. But we can account for this apparent counterexample without giving
up the validity of Strong Monotonicity by claiming that the natural interpretation of the
premise involves resolving the context-sensitivity in the two occurrences of ‘is big’ in
different ways. For example, on some accounts, context supplies a “comparison class”,
x. (ii) implies that x+ must be good, and Strong Monotonicity would then require x+ to be
better than y, when they should be incomparable. Regarding (i), obviously we are unmoved
by an argument against Strong Monotonicity that presupposes the negation of our conclusion,
Comparability, though our own argument from Strong Monotonicity may be similarly dialectically
ineffective against staunch proponents of Gustafsson’s axiology; we offer other principles below
that, together with Strong Monotonicity, form a package they might find harder to resist. But
even if we accepted (i), we would reject (ii). Analogous principles don’t seem plausible for other
comparatives: one room might be at a neutral temperature while being warmer than another room
at a neutral temperature. An alternative picture would involve a range of neutral things, some
of which are better than others (as in Rabinowicz 2009a). The idea that anything better than a
neutral thing must be good seems to rely on a very specific interpretation of ‘neutral’ (so specific,
in fact, that on Gustafsson’s own view, no possible lives are neutral in value), which we take to be
less pre-theoretically compelling than Strong Monotonicity itself. If Gustafsson’s view were true,
and if incomparability were possible, we would expect the notion of undistinguishedness not to
seem as unfamiliar as it does. And we see no evidence that it is a more general phenomenon that
extends beyond Gustafsson’s focus of population axiology. So, despite the interest of Gustafsson’s
axiology, more detailed discussion of his arguments would be out of step with this paper’s non-
domain-specific focus.
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which is plausibly different for the two uses.23, 24
Strong Monotonicity is a special case of a more general pattern. The following inference
also seems valid:
(23) Kara is very healthy, and Sam is not very healthy, so Kara is healthier than Sam.
The impression of validity remains if we replace ‘very’ by other “positive degree modi-
fiers”: ‘extremely’, ‘somewhat’, ‘pretty’, ‘quite’, etc. The case for the validity of Strong
Monotonicity thus extends to the following more general schema, where ‘V’ is to be
replaced any positive degree modifier:
Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity If x is V F and y is not V F, but y is F to
some degree, then x is F-er than y.
Strong Monotonicity can be seen as a special case of Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity
if (following the standard treatment in semantics going back to Bartsch and Vennemann
1972), we analyse sentences like ‘Kara is healthy’ as containing a phonologically null
degree modifier ‘POS’ that plays the same role that ‘very’ would play if it were present.
23Even if we do not treat ‘is big’ as containing an unpronounced comparison-class-denoting
variable, we might still treat it is containing an unpronounced “degree expression” POS (see
below), in which case we might plausibly attribute the relevant contextual variation to this element
rather than to the root word ‘big’.
24‘Is big’ also seems to admit a reading that can be paraphrased as ‘is big for one’s kind’ (where
the relevant kind might be one’s biological species or genus, or some more “folk” category):
consider for example ‘Due to pervasive overfeeding, almost every animal in that zoo is big’. That
reading of ‘big’ would allow for ‘This mouse is big and that elephant is not big’ to be true without
any equivocation. So as proponents of Strong Monotonicity, we are committed to the claim that
‘This mouse is bigger than that elephant’ is true when ‘big’ is interpreted in that way. This seems
defensible. That sentence does have a possible, though highly dispreferred, reading on which it is
true when the demonstrated mouse weighs much more than most mice while the demonstrated
elephant weighs less than most elephants. (Similarly, ‘more expensive’ has a reading where ‘That
is an expensive sandwich, but this cup of coffee is more expensive’ could be true if the sandwich
cost $15 and the cup of coffee cost $8.) It seems reasonable to suppose that this unusual reading
of ‘bigger than’ is the one that arises when we give ‘big’ the “big for its kind” reading, for which
one’s position on the relevant scale turns on the relation between one’s size and the size-statistics
characteristic of one’s kind.
For those who are not satisfied by this response, we note that the role of Strong Monotonicity in
our argument could equally well be played by the schema ‘If x is F for a K and y is not F for a K,
but y is a K and is F to some degree, then x is F-er than y’.
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Again, arguments like (23) are not quite certified as valid by Degree-Modified Strong
Monotonicity, without the additional assumption that both things are at least as F as
themselves. But this assumption seems even more clearly to be a presupposition of a
degree-modified adjective ‘V F’. And, as in (23), this presupposition projects through
negation (in addition to being obvious). For example, ‘The square root of two is not very
tall’ sounds bizarre because it presupposes that the square root of two has some degree of
height.
The validity of Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity is hard to deny. But it makes it
very hard to see how there could be any significant incomparability. For, given Degree-
Modified Strong Monotonicity, items that are divided by a degree-modified, positive form
of a gradable adjective—as in (23)—must be comparable. And any gradable adjective can
be degree-modified in many different ways. For example, imagine a possibly partial order
of people from the not at all funny to the supremely funny: in between there are (in no
particular order) people who are barely funny, somewhat funny, pretty funny, moderately
funny, slightly more than moderately funny, extremely funny, and so on. All of these
degree modifiers would have to impose bottlenecks in the ordering, across which there
can be no incomparability. This is implausible. If there is incomparability in Fness, it is
best explained by tradeoffs between dimensions of F: for example, two people who are
each funny in different respects, where our use doesn’t privilege any particular weighting
of these respects in such a way that one of them gets to count as funnier overall. One would
expect to be able to find such tradeoffs anywhere in the ordering, not just in between the
bottlenecks imposed by degree modifiers.
Put differently, Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity implies that, if some x is V F,
then every y to which x is incomparable is also V F. It follows that positive, degree
modified adjectives spread through chains of incomparability. But, if “multidimensional”
adjectives give rise to incomparability in the way that has been supposed, one would
expect such chains to be ubiquitous. For example, one would expect the following kind of
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case to be possible. Consider two sequences of careers x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn, where the
subscript represents one’s annual salary in dollars. For example, the x’s might be careers
as a philosopher and the y’s might be careers as an artist. For some value of n, xn and
yn might both be very good careers. If there is incomparability, we would expect it to be
possible for each xi to be neither better nor worse than, nor just as good as, yi. And we
would expect a dollar not to break the incomparability: if making i dollars per year as a
philosopher is neither better nor worse than, nor just as good as, making i dollars per year
as an artist, then making i− 1 dollars per year as a philosopher cannot plausibly be worse
than making i dollars per year as an artist. That is the kind of intuition that motivates
judgments of incomparability rather than equality in the first place. So suppose that xn—a
very good career—is not better than yn, which is not better than xn−1, which is not better
than yn−1, . . . , which is not better than x1, which is not better than y1. Because they reject
Negative Transitivity, fans of incomparability can say that xn is better than y1. But, given
Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity, they must say that y1 is still a very good career.
And that is absurd: no career in which one makes only a dollar a year is very good!
(iv) ‘The F-est things’. Strong Monotonicity has an analogue for superlatives that seems
similarly compelling:
Superlatives If x is one of the F-est Ks, and y is a K and is F to some degree but
is not one of the F-est Ks, x is F-er than y.25
Here K is schematic for a noun phrase, perhaps complex. The claim that Superlatives is
valid can be supported by appeal to the intuitive validity of various specific arguments:
for example ‘Parmesan is one of the most beloved cheeses, and Grana Padano is not one
of the most beloved cheeses; so, Parmesan is more beloved than Grana Padano’.26
25Note that the converse principle ‘If x is one of the F-est Ks, and x is F-er than y, y is not one of
the F-est Ks’ is not very plausible: ‘Anne and Bert are the tallest children in the class’ is consistent
with ‘Anne is taller than Bert’.
26As usual, we can explain why we don’t feel the need for the extra premise ‘Grana Padano is
at least as beloved as itself’ by appeal to presupposition. This also applies to ‘Grana Padano is a
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The upshot of Superlatives is that the only pluralities eligible to be denoted by ‘the
F-est Ks’ are those whose boundary marks a “bottleneck” for the relation expressed by ‘is
an F-er K than’, in the same sense in which Degree-Modified Strong Monotonicity requires
the extension of ‘V F’ to be a set whose boundary marks a bottleneck for the ‘is F-er than’
relation. But as we have seen, the standard motivations for positing incomparability
suggest that for many gradable adjectives F, when the extension of K is big enough, we
will be able to reach any K from any other K by a series of steps in which each item is a K
and is incomparable with its predecessor, so that there aren’t any such bottlenecks. In such
a case, then given Superlatives, the only candidate plurality to be denoted by ‘the F-est
Ks’ will be the plurality of all Ks. This seems absurd: claims like ‘A poorly-remunerated
career in manure-shovelling is not one of the best careers’ are unproblematic in a way that
they should not be if incomparabilities were common and Superlatives were true.
Indeed, it is rather tempting to think that whenever x is F-er than y and both are Ks, we
can find some candidate denotation for ‘the F-est Ks’ that includes x but not y. If so, then
given Superlatives, it would follow that any such x and y are separated by a bottleneck,
so that Negative Transitivity is true restricted to the Ks. We could sharpen this hunch by
turning to plural definite descriptions of the form ‘the n F-est Ks’, which do not seem to be
subject to the peculiar context-sensitivity of ‘the F-est Ks’ (although they of course inherit
any context sensitivity there might be in ‘F’ and ‘K’). The following principle concerning
such cardinality-specific plurals seems rather natural:
Cardinal Superlatives If x is F-er than y, x and y are both Ks, and there are at
most n Ks, then either x is the Fst K, or x is one of the two F-est Ks and y is not, or
x is one of the three F-est Ks and y is not, . . . , or x is one of the n − 1 F-est Ks and
y is not.
But given the obvious extension of Superlatives to cardinality-specific definites, Cardinal
Superlatives entails that Negative Transitivity holds restricted to the Ks whenever there
cheese’: ‘is [not] one of the Fst Ks’ seems generally to presuppose ‘is a K’.
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are finitely many Ks. It follows that Negative Transitivity holds in full generality: just take
K to be ‘thing identical to x or y or z’ for any given trio. And as we saw in section 1, there
is no interesting way of accepting Negative Transitivity while rejecting Comparability.
(v) ‘Much Fer than’. Our final argument is in the spirit of Degree-Modified Strong Mono-
tonicity but does not require any appeal to the positive or superlative forms of gradable
expressions. Consider the following inferences:
(24) Ann is much more creative than Bob. Cat is more creative, but not much more
creative, than Bob. So Ann is more creative than Cat.
(25) Io had a lot more fun than Jim. Kyle had more fun, but not a lot more fun, than
Jim. So Io had more fun than Kyle.
(26) Xan swam way faster than Yair. Zev swam faster, but not way faster, than Yair. So
Xan swam faster than Yair.
These seemingly impeccable inferences suggest the following generalization (where V
now stands for positive degree modifiers of the same sort as ‘much’, ‘a lot’, and ‘way’):
Much F-er Than If x is V F-er than z and y is F-er than z but not V F-er than z,
then x is F-er than y.27
Much F-er Than poses a problem for incomparability, because it entails that chains of
incomparability collapse the distinction between modified comparatives (‘much F-er’)
and their unmodified versions (‘F-er’). To see this, return to our two sequences of careers
x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn. Plausibly, for some n, xn is a much better career than x1. Suppose
again, though, that these sequences form a chain of incomparability: xn is not better than
yn, which is not better than xn−1, . . . , which is not better than x1. Then, by Much F-er Than,
if yn is better than x1, then it must be much better than x1; otherwise, xn would be better
27We would also accept the stronger version of this principle that replaces ‘y is F-er than z’ with
‘y is at least as F as itself’. But we focus here on the weaker version for dialectical reasons.
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than yn. By the same reasoning, xn−1 can be better than x1 only if it’s much better than x1;
otherwise, yn would be better than xn−1. More generally, for any k, xk is better than x1 only
if it’s much better. But, intuitively, though x2 is better than x1, it’s not much better: they
only differ by a dollar per year!
One could do something similar by appealing to a schema involving explicit compar-
isons of the amounts by which two objects improve on some third object:
Not As Much F-er As If x and y are both F-er than z, but y is not as much F-er
than z as x is, then x is F-er than y.
The validity of this schema explains the badness of speeches like the following:
(27) The tuna and the sable were both tastier than the whitefish. But the sable wasn’t
as much tastier as the tuna. However, the tuna was not tastier than the sable.
Like Much F-er Than, Not As Much F-er As collapses the distinction between modified
comparatives and their unmodified versions along chains of incomparability. For ex-
ample, applied to our sequences of careers, Not As Much F-er As implies that any career
better than x1 must be as much better than x1 as xn is. But this is absurd. Clearly x2, for
example, isn’t better than x1 by as much as xn.
This concludes our battery of arguments for Comparability. Some opponents may try
to dismiss our arguments as naively relying on deference to untutored folk intuitions (or
linguistic practices) which need not survive reflection on philosophical arguments against
Comparability, such as those discussed in §2. We have two responses. First, we need not
rely on any intuitions or judgments other than our own, and judgments we rely on need
not be unreflective (except to the extent that all argumentation on any subject whatsoever
must begin from a starting point prior to reflection). We have endeavoured to subject
the judgments of validity that provide the basis for our arguments to at least as much
reflective scrutiny as opponents of Comparability have brought to bear on the judgments
that drive their arguments. Second, although the folk are prone to many errors, there
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should be a strong presumption that deeply ingrained dispositions to treat certain general
argument-forms as if they were valid should not be dismissed as mistakes, unless there
is a compelling explanation for why we should systemically go wrong in these specific
ways. After all, use (and dispositions thereof) determines meaning, and it is plausible
that these sorts of ‘logical’ dispositions play an especially central role in giving our words
the meanings they have. So, opponents of Comparability are saddled with a heavy
explanatory burden: namely, to explain how comparative constructions get to express
relations that violate Comparability (and, more generally, how related constructions such
as the positive, superlative, equative, and degree-modified forms get to mean what they
do) contrary to the entrenched facts of usage. Our burden is less great: it is not at
all remarkable for philosophers to make errors, and the fact that many philosophers
are disposed to make certain kinds of inferences generates very little pressure towards
a semantics on which those inferences are truth-preserving. Still, in view of the wide
influence of the tradeoff and small improvement arguments, it is incumbent on us to say
something about them. We will do this in the next section.
4 Tradeoff and small improvement arguments revisited
We take the data considered in the previous section to provide a strong prima facie case
that Comparability is valid for every comparative construction in English. Let us now
revisit the influential arguments against Comparability that we surveyed in §2.
First: we admit that when one considers the multiplicity of dimensions and the diffi-
culty of making tradeoffs, speeches of the following kind can sound fine:
(28) Neither George Carlin nor Richard Pryor was funnier than the other. But they
were not equally funny.
The tradeoff argument works by eliciting such judgments, and using them to draw the
inference that there are cases of incomparability. We think they should be treated along
the same lines as
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(29) George Costanza is not bald, but he is also not not bald.
We are tempted to say things like (29) when it is vague whether or not someone is bald.
But the acceptability of such utterances is not a compelling argument against the thesis
that sentences of the form ‘P but not P’ are logically inconsistent in English. We don’t
need to have a theory about the nature of vagueness to see that (29) should not be taken
literally. Since “multidimensional” comparative adjectives are certainly vague, we should
similarly not take utterances like (28) to express literal truths. Their role is, rather, to
convey the speaker’s awareness that some (at least two) of the sentences ‘x is F-er than y’,
‘y is F-er than x’, ‘x and y are equally F’ are extensionally vague (i.e. not “definitely true”
or “definitely false”).
This diagnosis of the motivations that led philosophers to find utterances like (28) ob-
viously correct is strongly confirmed in many cases by an examination of the justifications
offered for the utterances. For example, we have seen some say that ‘there are no precise
truths’ (Parfit), that we ‘may not . . . be able to decide’ (Sen), or that there is ‘no answer’
(Keynes) to whether one thing is F-er than another. In one of the first statements of the
small improvement argument (quoted approvingly by Raz) Mackie (1977) suggests that
there may be no ‘objectively right and determinable answer’ to the question of whether
one thing is F-er than another. In his own discussion of the argument, Raz imagines a
‘small but definite improvement’ to one of two options, which suggests a contrast to a
possibly ‘indefinite’ comparison. Most tellingly, perhaps, is that proponents of incompar-
ability rarely make outright assertions like (28). Parfit (1984, p. 431) says we ‘might claim’
that neither of two things is F-er than the other, not that neither is F-er. Chang (1998,
p. 23) supposes that we ‘rationally judge’ that neither of two things is F-er than the other.
Carlson (2013, p. 449) gives a case in which neither of two things can ‘be said to be’ F-er.
Such hedged assertions and assessments of assertibility and reasonableness are precisely
what one would expect in the presence of vagueness. There is a marked contrast between
the sentences typically used to express the purported counterexamples to Comparability
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and, say, the sentences used to express purported counterexamples to Transitivity—e.g.,
“B is worse than A, C is worse than B, D is worse than C, . . . and Z is worse than Y, yet Z
is better than A” (Rachels 1998).
We are far from the first to appeal to vagueness in explaining away the appearance
of incomparability (see especially Broome 1997). Proponents of incomparability have
taken great pains to reject such appeals. Their arguments have been discussed at length
elsewhere.28 Our general impression is that the attempts to dismiss vagueness-based
diagnoses rely on highly tendentious characterizations of vagueness. For example, Chang
(2002) argues that borderline cases have a distinctive phenomenology in which, “insofar as
we are willing to judge that the predicate applies, we are also willing to judge that it does
not apply.” She suggests that, in putative cases of (what we’re calling) incomparability,
we are instead inclined to judge that one thing is not F-er than another, but not similarly
inclined to judge that it is. Chang admits that there might, in certain cases, be “perplexity”
about the comparative judgments. But Chang claims that the perplexity is distinct from the
kind that characterizes borderline cases, in which “it is perfectly permissible to resolve the
indeterminacy in favor of application or not” (683). In putative cases of incomparability,
by contrast, Chang suggests that “given a list of admissible ways in which the perplexity
might be resolved, there is still a further question as to how the perplexity is to be resolved,
for that resolution is not simply given by arbitrarily opting for one admissible resolution
over another” (685). For example, people who offer conflicting comparative judgments in
putative cases of incomparability are involved in a “genuine substantive disagreement”
(685), but people who offer conflicting resolutions of vague predicates are not.
Here is a simple way to see that these arguments are not compelling. Recall our
two sequences of careers x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn, where, for every i, the proponent of
incomparability is inclined to judge that xi is neither better nor worse than yi, which
is neither better nor worse than xi−1. Anyone with that inclination should be no less
28See, e.g., Elson (2017), Gustafsson (2013), and Williams (2016).
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inclined, for every i > 1, to judge that it is not the case that xi is a good career and
yi is not, and not the case that yi is a good career and xi−1 is not. But these negated
conjunctions lead to the absurd conclusion that it’s not the case that xn is good and and x1
is not.29 This pattern is characteristic of vagueness if anything is. But it is not plausible
that there is a distinctive phenomenology to the negated conjunctions that is absent in the
comparative judgments, or that one can permissibly settle on an arbitrary value of i at
which one rejects the negated conjunctions while remaining at a loss as to how to resolve
the perplexity raised by the corresponding comparisons, or that disagreement about the
comparative judgments is more genuinely substantive than conflicting resolutions of the
predicate ‘good’.30 Proponents of the tradeoff argument may continue to find it incredible
that there should be a single correct way to weigh between the different dimensions of
a multidimensional concept. But this seems no more incredible than familiar analogous
propositions about vague predicates—e.g., that a single cent can make the difference
between a career that is good and a career that is not.
The above diagnosis of the tradeoff argument could also be extended to the argument
from small improvements. This argument begins with a judgment concerning two rather
disparate items x and y, to the effect that neither is F-er than the other. This could be
rejected in the same way that we rejected (28), as a mistaken reaction to the recognition
that, due to vagueness in ‘F-er’, neither ‘x is F-er than y’ nor ‘y is F-er than x’ is definitely
true.
It is worth noting, however, that small improvement arguments look like suspiciously
powerful tools for arguing against claims of the form ‘x and y are equally F’ even when
29At least, they do so in classical logic, and in prominent nonclassical logics like intuitionism
and the paraconsistent logic of Field (2003). They do not do so in the very weak logic of Fine (2017),
in which vagueness is held to invalidate not only Excluded Middle but the rule of Conjunctive
Syllogism (‘P; not (P and Q); therefore not-Q’).
30Note also that the monadic predicate isn’t the only one that is clearly susceptible to vagueness.
We are also inclined, for every i > 1, to judge that it’s not the case that yi is better than x1 but yi−1
is not. But these judgments, which are suspiciously similar to the “small improvement” intuition,
lead to the absurd conclusion that it’s not the case that yn is better than x1 and y1 is not.
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we haven’t already ruled out ‘x is F-er than y’ and ‘y is F-er than x’. Claims of the form ‘x
and y are equally F’ are commonplace in everyday life. For example, a hiring committee
chair might utter
(30) These two candidates are equally well qualified on paper, so we will have to make
a case based on our opinions of the writing samples.
A small-improvement-monger might object:
Really? So, you are committed to the view that if Candidate A had TAed for
just one additional class, they would have been slightly better qualified than
Candidate B (since clearly in that case they would have been slightly better
qualified than they actually are)? Isn’t that an implausibly strong thing to be
committed to?
In the context of an actual conversation in non-philosopher-speak, the above objection
sounds silly and pedantic. Raz himself says, of a person choosing between a legal career
and a musical career, “He is equally suited for both, and he stands an equal chance of
success in both” (126).
One possible account of what is going on appeals to context-sensitivity. According
to this account, comparative expressions can in some contexts take on “coarse-grained”
meanings, where the domain is “chunked” into some finite number of discrete sections.
The relations expressed in a coarse-grained context by ‘equally F’ and ‘at least as F as’ will
hold universally within each chunk, while the relation expressed by ‘F-er than’ holds only
between things in different chunks. When we start paying attention to small differences
in the relevant underlying factors, that generates pressure to change the context to a
more fine-grained one, which means the extension of ‘F-er than’ will expand to include
certain pairs of items that were previously in the same chunk.31 On this account, the
31Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) propose a “chunking” account for ‘as F as’, ‘at least as F
as’ and ‘exactly as F as’. However they do not extend the account to ‘F-er than’, so their theory
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small improvement argument can be diagnosed as turning on a shift in the context. When
we initially consider the disparate items x and y, the most natural resolution of context-
sensitivity is a rather coarse-grained one that puts them in the same chunk, since, because
of vagueness, there is no non-arbitrary grounds for choosing a resolution of context
sensitivity that makes one but not the other of ‘x is F-er than y’ and ‘y is F-er than x’ true.
The first premise, ‘x is not F-er than y and y is not F-er than x’, is thus true in the context
in which it is uttered; ‘x and y are equally F’ is also true in this context. But when we are
invited to pay attention to the small differences between x and x+, we are pushed into a
new, more fine-grained context, in which ‘x+ is F-er than x’ is true.
An alternative diagnosis appeals to pragmatics rather than semantic context-sensitivity.
On this account, when we say ‘These things are equally F’, we are very often speaking
loosely (non-literally). Analogously, some philosophers argue that when we say ‘The cities
are 853 miles apart’ or ‘They arrived at 3pm’ we are almost never speaking literally, since
the literal truth conditions are ultra-demandingly exact (Hoek 2018). But if that’s the
diagnosis, it is plausible that the same kind of looseness is in play when, at the beginning
of the small improvement argument, we are inclined to accept ‘Neither of x and y is F-er
than the other’. This seems to be a different kind of nonliteral speech from the kind
exemplified by ‘He is not bald, but he is also not not bald’, since it doesn’t have anything
special to do with negation. However, the two sources of nonliteralness could sometimes
both be in play.
We need not commit ourselves to any particular diagnosis of the apparent assertibility
of sentences like (30). It seems likely that, whatever the diagnosis, it can help to explain
away the apparent truth of the key premises of the small improvement argument—which,
as we have said, are rarely asserted outright in the first place.
surprisingly predicts the consistency of ‘a is F-er than b and b as at least as F as a’. While they
could give a pragmatic account of the oddity of this conjunction by positing that the first conjunct
tends to push us into a more “fine-grained” context where the chunks are small enough to make
the second conjunct false, it seems better to us to preserve the validity of Comparative/Equative
by applying the “chunking” to comparatives as well as equatives.
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5 Other objections to Comparability
Even after we set the tradeoff and small improvement arguments aside, there are some
putative counterexamples to Comparability which might convince someone that it cannot
be a valid schema. One class of counterexamples is typified by (31):
(31) Either this cup of coffee is at least as good as the latest Star Wars movie, or the
latest Star Wars movie is at least as good as this cup of coffee.
There is an air of absurdity to (31). It’s not that there are some respects in which the coffee
is better than the movie which we have trouble weighing against respects in which the
movie is better than the coffee: it is hard to even imagine a case where either of the disjuncts
of (31) is straightforwardly true. But, given Comparability, (31) is a logical consequence
of ‘This cup of coffee is good to some degree and the latest Star Wars movie is good to
some degree’. And given Restricted Reflexivity, this is in turn a logical consequence of
(32) This cup of coffee is at least as good as the last one I ordered in Starbucks, and the
latest Star Wars movie is at least as good as The Phantom Menace
which seems perfectly fine.
It seems to us that whatever is going on in (31) is also going on in (33), which is perhaps
more suggestive of what the diagnosis should be:
(33) Either this seminar is at least as long as Fifth Avenue, or Fifth Avenue is at least as
long as this seminar.
This is at least as absurd as (31). But given Comparability and Restricted Reflexivity it
should be a logical consequence of perfectly fine conjunctions like
(34) This seminar is longer than the one last week, and Broadway is longer than Fifth
Avenue.
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The right way to block the inference from (34) to (33), we claim, is to appeal to context-
sensitivity (or polysemy, if that’s not just a kind of context-sensitivity) in ‘long’. ‘Long’
has one reading where it has to do with time, and another where it has to do with space.
On the former, ‘x is as long as y’ is true only when x and y are events; on the latter, it
is true only when x and y are (appropriately shaped and oriented) physical objects. The
natural reading of (34) is a non-uniform one where the first occurrence of ‘longer than’
has the temporal meaning and the second one has the spatial meaning; but this does not
entail (33) on any of its possible readings (whether uniform or mixed).
A parallel diagnosis is plausible for (31), given the widely recognised context-sensitivity
(or polysemy) of ‘good’. This also generates a multiplicity of possible interpretations for
‘better than’ and ‘at least as good as’: for example, if A is a professional cellist and entry
level safecracker and B is a professional safecracker and beginning cellist, ‘A is better
than B’ could be uttered truly in a conversation among bank robbers while ‘B is at least
as good as A’ was uttered truly in a conversation between the organisers of a musical
soirée. Among the salient possible interpretations of ‘x at least as good as y’ are relations
that hold only among cups of coffee; relations that hold only among movies; relations
that hold only among servings of food or drink; relations that hold only among cultural
products (movies, plays, novels, songs. . . ); and so on. Neither of the disjuncts of (31) is
true on any of these interpretations. But (32) isn’t true either if we interpret it uniformly
using any of these interpretations. The reason (32) seems so much better than (31) is that
it is true on its most natural interpretations, which are non-uniform ones where the first
‘at least as good as’ corresponds to some relation that movies can’t bear to anything (even
themselves), and the second ‘at least as good as’ corresponds to some relation that cups
of coffee can’t bear to anything (even themselves).32
32(31) cannot be saved by interpreting its two occurrences of ‘good’ non-uniformly, since no
salient interpretation makes either disjunct true. It is interesting to consider what happens if we
expand the sentence so that there are two occurrences of ‘good’ in each disjunct:
(31*) Either this cup of coffee is at least as good as the latest Star Wars movie is good, or the
latest Star Wars movie is at least as good as this cup of coffee is good.
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It wouldn’t be plausible to hold that ‘at least good as’ and ‘better than’ can never express
relations whose relata include both cups of coffee and movies. For example, in the right
context ‘good’ could mean ‘good as a conversation topic on your next date’. But in such a
context, (31) seems fine. The fact that (31) is odd out of the blue can be explained by saying
that interpretations of this sort are sufficiently unsalient, and sufficiently disparate, that
we would expect speakers to provide some contextual pointers before saying something
that relies on one of them.
Another quite different family of putative counterexamples to Comparability turns on
terms of art like “is stronger than,” meaning entails. If p does not entail q, and q does not
entail p, neither is stronger than the other, but they are not equally strong, in this technical
sense.
We grant that speakers can go against the linguistic grain and stipulate meanings for
comparative adjectives that do not conform to the general rules. For example, one can,
with diligent effort, impose a use on ‘westerly’ such that ‘Tokyo is more westerly than New
York’, ‘New York is more westerly than Istanbul’, ‘Istanbul is more westerly than Tokyo’,
and ‘Nothing is more westerly than itself’ are all true. Such stipulative uses should not
be taken to refute the thesis that transitivity is guaranteed by the meaning of comparative
morphology in spoken dialects of non-artificial languages.33 If the stipulation only applies
One might expect that if our diagnosis of the oddity of (31) is correct, (31*) should be much better
than (31) because of the possibility of interpreting the two ‘good’s in each disjunct differently. ((31)
would standardly be treated as derived from (31*) by ellipsis; however since ellipsis normally
seems to rule out non-uniform interpretation, this is compatible with one sentence being much
better than the other.) We are not clear on whether there is a relevant contrast between (31) and
(31*): it’s hard to get past the fact that the latter just sounds strange and stilted. But if it’s true
that (31*) is odd in the same way as (31), one possible explanation of this would be to say that
the two salient interpretations of ‘good’ are not only distinct, but not “associated with the same
scale”, so that the cross-adjectival comparison is analogous to ‘You are more beautiful than I am
clever’ rather than ‘The mountain is taller than the lake is deep’ (see n. 6). If (unlike Bale 2008)
takes the former to require some special, non-default semantic or pragmatic interpretation, one
could appeal to the lack of salience of the extra ingredients required for this to explain why (31*)
is not markedly better than (31).
33Even if one does take such stipulative uses to refute Transitivity, that position is not helpful to
opponents of Comparability who are motivated by the small improvement argument, which (as
we saw on page 13) requires Transitivity for its validity.
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to the two-word expression ‘stronger than’, it involves some noncompositional use of
that expression where it only orthographically appears to embed the gradable adjective
‘strong,’ in which case it is not really a counter-example to Comparability. Moreover, when
one goes against the linguistic grain in this way, ordinary usage will tend to reassert itself,
as people use other syntactic forms not covered by the original stipulation, relying on the
ordinary meanings of those forms in ways that are apt to lead to all kinds of confusions.
For example, philosophers will sometimes say that one theory is “much stronger than”
or “only a little stronger than” another, and will be tempted to assume unreflectively that
if T3 is much stronger than T1 and T2 is only a little stronger, then T3 is stronger than
T2, even though this is not guaranteed given the stipulated meaning for ‘stronger than’.
Such confusions are to be expected on our view that there is a general logic of gradable
adjectives, since this logic would make it easy to slip into modes of reasoning that it
supports. And we conjecture that, as speakers start to treat these originally stipulative
expressions like gradeable adjectives in other ways, they will also start to use them in
ways that conform to Comparability and the more specific patterns of inference that we
have highlighted in its support.
6 Preference
This completes our case for Comparability. In this section and the next, we argue that it
has two philosophically interesting consequences: the completeness of preferences, and
the ubiquity of credences.
The small improvement argument made its debut not as an argument against any
instance of Comparability, but as an argument against a thesis about preference and indif-
ference:
Rational Preference Completeness Necessarily, if one is rational, then if one has
some preferences about A and some preferences about B, one either prefers A to
B, prefers B to A, or is indifferent between A and B.
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This thesis plays a central role in the canonical axiomatic developments of decision theory.
But from the beginning there has been a widespread skepticism. According to von
Neumann and Morgenstern (2007, p. 630), ‘It is very dubious, whether the idealization
of reality which treats this postulate [‘the completeness of the individual’s system of
preferences’] as a valid one, is appropriate or even convenient.’ Aumann (1962, p. 446)
agrees: ‘Of all the axioms of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most
questionable. Like others of the axioms, it is inaccurate as a description of real life; but
unlike them, we find it hard to accept even from the normative viewpoint.’ Even authors
who accept Comparability seem willing to reject Rational Preference Completeness (e.g.,
Broome 1991, pp. 92–93).
Though these these authors and many others have their doubts about Rational Pref-
erence Completeness, a thesis about rational preferences, they take for granted that the
preferences of actual (possibly irrational) human beings are incomplete, i.e. that Descript-
ive Preference Completeness is false:
Descriptive Preference Completeness Necessarily, if one has any preferences
about x and y, either one prefers x to y, prefers y to x, or is indifferent between x
and y.
For example, Bales, Cohen, and Handfield (2013) assert that “incomplete preferences are
ubiquitous in ordinary life.” And many recent contributions to descriptive decision theory
either argue that some agents have incomplete preferences, or simply take for granted
that they do and go on to offer models of such agents (Bleichrodt 2007, Eliaz and Ok 2006,
Galaabaatar and Karni 2013, Mandler 2004, Mandler 2005, Ok 2002). We suspect that
almost everyone would reject Descriptive Preference Completeness.34 Everyone, that is,
but us.
34Steele and Stefánsson (2016) raise doubts about a ‘Completeness’ principle they write as ‘For
any A,B ∈ S, either A 4 B or B 4 A’, where S is a set of options, and ‘4 represents a weak preference
relation, i.e., the relation “. . . is not preferred to . . . ”’. So, if we take them at their word, and
assume the validity of de Morgan’s laws, their Completeness principle actually says that it never
happens that someone both prefers A to B and prefers B to A. Even opponents of Descriptive
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As unpopular as Descriptive Preference Completeness may be, Comparability can
be leveraged into a powerful argument in its defense. Of course, ‘prefer to’ is not the
comparative form of any gradable expression, so our arguments for Comparability do
not immediately bear on Descriptive Preference Completeness. But they can be brought
to bear indirectly by appealing to certain plausible equivalences between ‘prefer’ and the
sort of gradable items to which Comparability applies. Consider:
Comparative Preference a prefers x to y if and only if a likes x better than y.
Comparative Indifference a is indifferent between x and y if and only if a likes
x and y equally well.
Both of these equivalences seem valid to us. But if they are, the validity of Descriptive
Preference Completeness will follow from that of Comparability.35
In support of the validity of the equivalences, we can point to the fact that speeches
like ‘She likes vanilla more than chocolate, but she doesn’t prefer vanilla to chocolate’,
or ‘He prefers scuba diving to hang gliding although he likes hang gliding more than
scuba diving’ seem flatly incoherent. Likewise, ‘She likes these two restaurants equally
well but she’s not indifferent between them’ sounds bizarre: what more, we might think,
does the speaker think is required for the agent to be indifferent between options? (In
fact Comparative Indifference isn’t really crucial to our argument. For opponents of
Descriptive Preference Completeness will certainly think that the analogue of Negative
Transitivity fails for preference: one can prefer x+ to x while failing to prefer x+ to y or y to
x, and still preferring y to something or other. But Comparative Preference and Negative
Transitivity jointly imply that this never happens.)
Preference Completeness might well accept this. While Steele and Stefánsson’s definition of 4 is
perhaps just a slip, we think it is a telling one since it shows how easy it is to slip into taking
Descriptive Preference Completeness for granted even while attempting to raise objections to it.
35Indeed, we only need the right-to-left directions of these schemas, although the left-to-right
directions seem equally plausible.
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There is room to fuss about the details of the way we formulated Comparative Prefer-
ence: for example, about the grammatical objects of ‘prefer’ and ‘like’ (the form we used,
with ‘to’, can be used with noun phrases and gerunds; but we need to switch to ‘than’ if
we want x and y to be infinitival clauses or ‘that’ clauses); the mood of the verbs (‘would
prefer’ and ‘would like’ are more natural in some cases, and yield interpretations that are
more anchored to a particular occasion as opposed to one’s standing dispositions36); the
verb and adverb on the right-hand side (instead of ‘like better’ we could have ‘like more’
or ‘want more’, ‘desire more strongly’, etc.) None of these variations are important for our
argument, which requires only that there is some equivalence (or even a mere entailment)
between ‘prefers’ and some expression in the class to which Comparability applies.
The validity of Comparative Preference can be further supported by the observation
that in many languages, the natural translations of English sentences involving ‘prefer’
use some explicitly comparative adjective, adverb, or verb. For example, here’s how you
would say ‘I prefer tea to coffee’ in Irish:
Is
is
fearr
better
liom
with me
tae
tea
ná
than
caife.
coffee
Mandarin:
Bıˇ qıˇ
compare
ka¯fe¯i,
coffee,
woˇ
I
gèng
more
xıˇhua¯n
like
chá
tea
Hindi:
Mujko
For me
coffee
coffee
chai
tea
se
than
adhik
more
pasand
pleasing
hai
is
and Finnish:
Pidän
I like
teestä
tea
enemmän
more
kuin
than
kahvista
coffee
36Note that despite appearances, ‘would prefer’ and ‘would like’ are not normally about the psy-
chological state the relevant person would have been in under some counterfactual circumstances:
cf. ‘I would prefer my grave to be garlanded with peonies’.
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Some of these languages do also have non-comparative words that could be used to
provide less natural translations of sentences involving ‘prefer’.37 But Irish at least doesn’t
seem to have any word like that, while in Finnish it is a recent import. Of course, there is
always the option of saying that the languages in question cannot, or cannot easily, be used
to talk about preference. But this sits very oddly with the great explanatory importance
ascribed to the notion of preference by the orthodox decision-theoretic tradition: it is
hard to believe that some human languages have cut themselves off from something so
psychologically fundamental.
One salient argument against Descriptive Preference Completeness proceeds from the
identification of preferences with behavioral dispositions, along the lines of:
Preferences as Dispositions a prefers x to y if and only if a is disposed to choose
x when presented with a choice between x and y.38
Since someone could presumably be disposed to choose x+ when given the choice between
x+ and x without being disposed to choose x+ when given the choice between x+ and y or
disposed to choose y when given the choice between y and x, Preferences as Dispositions
is in clear tension with Descriptive Preference Completeness.39 But even setting aside
our argument for Descriptive Preference Completeness, it is quite implausible that there
is any possible meaning for ‘prefer’ (or any other piece of psychological vocabulary in
ordinary English) that is so tightly tied to behavioural dispositions. For good reasons,
philosophers of mind since around 1960 have been pretty much universally agreed on the
falsity of behaviorism. So it is somewhat odd that behaviorism continues to be treated as
37In Mandarin you could also say ‘Bıˇ qıˇ ka¯fe¯i, woˇ pia¯n’ài chá’—likewise, while the natural
German translation is ‘Ich habe Tee lieber als Kaffee’, one can also say ‘Ich ziehe Tee dem Kaffee
vor’.
38See, e.g., Savage 1954, p. 17. While few these days seem to regard Preferences as Dispositions
as unequivocally true, it seems quite common to think that ‘prefer’ has multiple senses, one of
which comes down to behaviour in something like this way (see, e.g., Hausman 2011, §1.1).
39It’s a little hard to be fully specific here, since ‘disposed’ is itself a gradable adjective (Manley
and Wasserman 2007), and it is unclear where one should set the threshold for its positive (non-
comparative) form in evaluating claims like Preferences as Dispositions.
44
a live option in the literature on decision theory.40
Some moral philosophers (Broome 2006, Hausman 2011) and decision theorists (e.g.
Joyce 1999, p. 40) understand preferences as a kind of judgment, endorsing something like:
Preferences as Judgments a prefers x to y if and only if a judges x to be better
than y.
Given that it seems obvious that there are cases where someone (even someone rational)
judges x+ to be better than x without judging x+ to be better than y or judging y to be better
than x, Preferences as Judgments plausibly requires giving up Descriptive Preference
Completeness (and perhaps also Rational Preference Completeness).41 Of course, if one
reasons in accordance with Comparability and judges x+ to be better than x, one will
judge that either x+ is better than y or y is better than x; but in general, we would expect
it to be possible to judge that P or Q without judging that P or judging that Q. Our case
for Descriptive Preference Completeness thus counts against Preferences as Judgments
and a wide array of other claims with a similar structure: for example, views that equate
preferring x to y with judging x to be more desirable than y, finding x to be better than y, with
x’s seeming better to one than y, etc. But even setting aside our arguments for Descriptive
Preference Completeness, the equation of preferences with judgments does not strike us as
well-motivated.42 ‘I prefer vanilla to chocolate although I’m not sure it’s better’ certainly
40The tradition of functionalism which superceded behaviourism in the philosophy of mind has
provided a range of ways of making sense of the idea that there are “constitutive links” between
mental states and behavioural dispositions that are more like presumptions that hold in normal
cases than necessary and sufficient conditions. However, it is not obvious how one could go
about arguing against Descriptive Preference Completeness from a weakening of Preferences as
Dispositions along these lines.
41Indeed, since it is also independently plausible that one could prefer x+ to x without judging
x+ to be better than y or judging y to be better than x, the left-to-right direction of Preferences
as Judgments is already enough to generate the tension. This direction would be accepted, for
example, by R. Bradley (2017, ch. 4), who holds a “hybrid” theory on which preference is the
conjunction of a judgment with a behavioural disposition.
42Some authors seem to think that if preferences are not behavioural dispositions they must
be judgments. For example, Steele and Stefánsson (2016) equate the thesis that preferences are
“mental attitudes” with the thesis that they are “considered judgments about whether an option
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doesn’t sound incoherent in the way that ‘I like vanilla better than chocolate although I
don’t prefer it’ does.43 Moreover, as soon as we recognise the possibility of suspension of
judgment as regards which of two options is better—as we must if the judgment theory
is to motivate rejection of Descriptive Preference Completeness—we will be naturally led
to think about differences in confidence about which of two options is better, and by how
much; and such differences this will bring into view a whole new array of reasons to prefer
one option to another without judging it to be better. For example, if one has middling
confidence that x is much better than y, while being sure that y is at most slightly better
than x, one could naturally end up preferring x to y. More generally, we find it strange
to suppose that a binary cognitive attitude such as judgment should be foundational for
the purposes of (normative or descriptive) decision theory, given that so much of decision
theory has been concerned with the kinds of graded attitudes that become important in
situations of uncertainty.
Some readers may find Descriptive Preference Completeness so implausible that they
prefer to treat our argument in this section as a reductio of Comparability. But even this
move would have some surprising implications. Many theorists who reject Descriptive
Preference Completeness would also deny the analogous principle for transitivity of pref-
erence: while the claim that rational people always have transitive preferences is widely
endorsed, discussions of that thesis typically treat it as obvious that at least irrational
people can have intransitive preferences.44 These theorists would insist that it is possible
for an agent to prefer x to y and y to z without preferring x to z. But, as we said at the
outset of this paper, Transitivity is far less controversial than Comparability. And, by
is better or more desirable than another”; likewise, R. Bradley (2017, ch. 4) treats ‘mental attitude’
as interchangeable with ‘judgment’. We find this conflation mysterious.
43We take ‘I’m not sure it’s better’ to entail or implicate ‘I don’t judge that it is better’. Some may
feel that ‘I don’t think it’s better’ makes the sentence sound worse, but this is plausibly because
‘thinks’ neg-raises so that ‘I don’t think it’s better’ pragmatically implies ‘I think it’s not better’.
44E.g., Resnik (1987, pp. 23–4) thinks that ‘Experiments can easily determine that humans are
not always able to have transitive preferences’, although ‘the transitivity conditions characterize
the preferences of an ideally rational agent’. For the minority view that even rational people can
have intransitive preferences, see Fishburn 1991.
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Comparative Preference, we can similarly argue from Transitivity to the conclusion that,
necessarily, everyone has transitive preferences. This suggests that readers who find De-
scriptive Preference Completeness too incredible to be believed would be better off trying
to find a way of resisting the arguments for Comparative Preference that we gave above,
rather than attempting to use it as a lever to argue against Comparability.
7 Confidence and credence
Bayesians and many others have found it fruitful to theorise about a relation between
people, propositions, and real numbers: a given real number in the unit interval [0, 1]
can be a given person’s credence in a given proposition, also known as their “degree of
belief” in it, or its “subjective probability” for them. This technical terminology is often
characterised in a way that links it to the familiar notion of confidence, from Savage (1954,
p. 3) (‘[P]robability measures the confidence that a particular individual has in the truth
of a particular proposition’) to Titelbaum (2019, p. 1) (‘Credences are numerical degrees of
confidence’). This naturally suggests two principles linking the technical use of ‘credence’
to the ordinary word ‘confident’:
Credence Existence If a is confident to some degree that P, then there exists a
real number x in the unit interval that is a’s credence that P.
Credence/Confidence If there exist real numbers x and y such that x > y and x
is a’s credence that P and y is b’s credence that Q, then a is more confident that P
than b is that Q.45
45Note that given Credence/Confidence, Credence Existence is equivalent to the following prin-
ciple: if a is at least as confident that P as b is that Q, then there exist real numbers x and y such
that x ≥ y and x is a’s credence that P and y is b’s credence that Q. The converse of this would
be slightly stronger than Credence/Confidence, since it also implies that sameness of credence
suffices for equal confidence. We confine our attention to the weaker version in order to allow
for the possibility of fine-grained differences in confidence without differences in credence. For
example, perhaps one could be less confident that a certain fair coin will not land heads every day
throughout an infinite future than that it either will or will not do this, despite having credence
1 in both propositions. As Koopman (1940, p. 767) puts it: “Numerical probability gives but a
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Other gradable adjectives we could use in place of ‘confident’ here include ‘certain’ and
‘sure’.
While Credence/Confidence looks hard to deny, Credence Existence is quite contro-
versial. In the large literature on “imprecise probability” (going back to Keynes 1921), it
is a commonplace that, with a few isolated exceptions primarily involving logical truths
and gambling setups, real human beings almost never have unique real numbers that are
their credences in any propositions. For example:
As many commentators have observed. . . , numerically sharp degrees of belief
are psychologically unrealistic. It is rare, outside casinos, to find opinions
that are anywhere near definite or univocal enough to admit of quantification.
(Joyce 2010)
But probability theory seems to impute much richer and more determinate
attitudes than seems warranted. What should your rational degree of belief be
that global mean surface temperature will have risen by more than four degrees
by 2080? Perhaps it should be 0.75? Why not 0.75001? Why not 0.7497? . . . It
seems there are many events about which we can (or perhaps should) take less
precise attitudes than orthodox probability requires. (S. Bradley 2019)
[T]here are plenty of circumstances in which we manifest confidence without
lending point-valued subjective probability. Indeed this looks to be more the
norm than the exception in everyday life. (Sturgeon 2019, ch. 3)
Claims like these are generally treated as obvious starting points in the relevant literature,
which focuses instead on the normative question whether it is ever rationally permissible
(or even rationally compulsory) to have such “imprecise credence”. (The dominant answer
is yes on both counts.)46
blurred rendering of the ultimate logical relations between probability and certainty”.
46The frequent occurrences of words like ‘precise’ and ‘definite’ in the literature (as in the above
quotes from Joyce and Bradley) might suggest an interpretation on which their claims are not in
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So, it is not uninteresting to observe that Comparability generates a lot of pressure to
accept Credence Existence. The pressure arises from the undisputed possibility of each
rational-valued credence:
Credence Possibility For every rational x ∈ [0, 1], it is possible that for some a
and P, x is a’s credence that P.
For example, it seems quite apt to characterise someone who is absolutely certain that a
ball will be fairly chosen from an urn containing m red balls and n green balls, and takes
this into account in the usual way, as having credence m/ (m + n) in the proposition that
a red ball will be chosen. None of our authors would dispute this: their objection is to
the extension of the same numerical measure to cases in which the available evidence is
sparser or more disparate. But by appealing to Comparability together with the seemingly
unproblematic Credence/Confidence, we can use these uncontroversial cases of credence
as a yardstick to assign a real-valued credence to any any pair of a person and a proposition
in which they are confident to some degree.
To spell this out, let us introduce the following definitions:
x is a [lower/upper] bound on a’s credence that P := a is [more/less] confident that P
than anyone who had credence x in some proposition could be in that proposition.
conflict with Credence Existence. Perhaps some authors in the tradition are merely saying that
the word ‘credence’ (and ‘degree of belief’ and ‘subjective probability’) are vague, in such a way
that there is typically no real number to which ‘x’s degree of belief in p’ definitely applies, just as
there is no natural number to which ‘the least number of hairs one could have without being bald’
definitely applies. This claim is consistent with Credence Existence, and should be uncontroversial:
outside of logic, mathematics, and perhaps certain parts of physics, almost all words are rather
vague, and it would be naïve to suppose that the technical term ‘credence’ was introduced in a way
that avoided it. However, some authors in the tradition are quite explicit in rejecting Credence
Existence, such as Sturgeon in the above quote. Moreover, many authors develop further theories
about “imprecise probability” which suggest that they were not just making the banal point about
vagueness. For example, they describe alternative abstract objects, such as sets of functions from
propositions to real numbers (‘representors’: van Fraassen 1990), which are supposed to be able to
represent certain states of opinion that are not aptly represented by functions from propositions to
real numbers. But if the only problem with the latter was one of vagueness, it is unclear one would
take this to be progress: it would be just as naïve to assume that ‘representor’ was introduced in
such a way as to make predicates involving it, like ‘the set of values to which the members of a’s
representor map proposition p’, have definite application beyond a few special cases.
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Using these definitions, we can state the following very plausible sufficient condition for
having a credence:
Sufficiency If every non-negative rational number less than x is a lower bound
on a’s credence that P, and every rational number greater than x and no greater
than 1 is an upper bound on a’s credence that P, then a’s credence that P is x.
This is motivated by the idea that if a real number x satisfies the antecedent, it does
everything we could sensibly demand of a “numerical measure” of a’s degree of confidence
that P.
But given Comparability, Credence Possibility, and Credence/Confidence, we can
show that necessarily, whenever A is confident to some degree that P, there is some
x which satisfies the antecedent of Sufficiency.47 These three principles together with
Sufficiency thus entail Credence Existence.
Given Comparability, this argument looks hard to resist. None of the worries about
real-valued credence suggests any reason to worry about Credence Possibility or Credence/-
47First, we show that y < y′ whenever y and y′ are rational and respectively a lower and an
upper bound on a’s credence that P. Suppose they are. It can’t be that y = y′, since by Credence
Possibility there is a possible world w at which some person b has credence y in some Q, which
would mean that b at w was both more and less confident that Q than a actually is that P: this is
impossible by Comparative/Equative. Also, it can’t be that y > y′. For by Credence Possibility
there are w, w′, b, b′, Q, Q′ such that at w, b has credence y that Q and at w′, b′ has credence y′
that Q′. By Credence/Confidence, b′ is more confident at w that Q′ than b is at w′ that Q. Since y
is a lower bound on a’s credence that P, a is actually more confident that P than b is at w that Q.
And since y′ is an upper bound, b′ is, at w′, more confident that Q′ than a actually is that P. By
Transitivity, it follows that a is more confident that P than a is that P, which is inconsistent given
Comparative/Equative.
Second, we show that for any rational y and y′ such that 0 ≤ y < y′ ≤ 1, either y is a lower bound
on a’s credence that P or y′ is an upper bound. For this to be false, there would have to be some
w, w′, b, b′, Q, and Q′ such that b’s credence at w that Q is y; b′’s credence at w′ that Q′ is y′; a is
not actually more confident that P than b is at w that Q; and a is not actually less confident that P
than b′ is at w′ that Q′. Given Negative Transitivity and the fact that a is confident to some degree
that P, it follows that b′ is not more confident at w′ that Q′ than b is at w that Q, contradicting
Credence/Confidence.
It follows from these two results that the least upper bound of the set of rational lower bounds
of a’s credence in P is identical to the greatest lower bound of the set of rational upper bounds of
a’s credence in P. This number thus satisfies the antecedent of Sufficiency.
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Confidence.48 And denying Sufficiency seems simply to change the subject from credence
understood as a measure of confidence to something else. Proponents of this option ur-
gently owe us some alternative positive conception of what they take having a credence
in a proposition to require. And even if they answer this challenge, we can still just use
the antecedent of Sufficiency to define some new technical term, say ‘x is a’s confidence-
number that P’, and continue to theorise using the analogues of Credence Existence and
Credence/Confidence for this.
The idea that Credence Existence stands or falls with Comparability for adjectives
like ‘confident’ is not at all new. Opposition to real-valued credence has often been
inferred from, or used to motivate, failures of completeness for so-called “comparative
probability” relations, which are typically explained using gradable adjectives. A central
source for the tradition is Keynes (1921), whose explicit denial of comparability with
regard to ‘probable’ we have already noted in §2. Koopman (1940), an early proponent of
48Note that the argument would still work if we weakened Credence/Confidence by restricting
it to propositions about balls in urns and agents who assign credences to those propositions in the
canonical way by learning about the chances, so long as we strengthen Sufficiency accordingly
(by inserting the same restriction in the definition of ‘lower bound’ and ‘upper bound’); the
strengthened version seems just as plausible as the original.
The one author we are aware of who has raised doubts about Credence/Confidence is Williamson
(2019), who argues that “The normal use of the word ‘confident’ does not fit the ideology of
credences”. His idea is that even if, for example, I have moderately higher credence that horse 7
will win the race than that any other horse in the race will win, ‘I have no confidence that horse 7
will win’ might still be true. He takes this to entail that ‘I am more confident that horse 7 will win
than that horse 6 will win’ is false (despite my higher credence). In response: this ‘no confidence’
seems analogous to other cases where we treat small quantities as if they were zero, e.g. ‘I have no
interest in your explanations’, ‘There is no prospect of his being elected’, etc. On the ‘chunking’
account of this kind of phenomeon suggested in section 4, Williamson’s claims are correct in some
coarse-grained contexts, but this does not count against the truth of Credence/Confidence in fine-
grained contexts (which are natural for comparatives: consider ‘If a’s height exceeds b’s height
by one micron, a is taller than b’). Williamson supports his thesis by pointing out that ‘Which
horse are you most confident will win?’ feels to have a false presupposition in the imagined
circumstances. But for many adjectives it can seem a bit odd to make comparisons between objects
near the bottom of the scale, even when such comparisons have a salient true reading. ‘Ordinary
headaches are quite unpleasant, but at least they are more pleasant than migraines’ has a salient
true reading, even though ‘Ordinary headaches are not at all pleasant’ seems fine, and ‘Which is
more pleasant, ordinary headaches or migraines?’ tends to suggest the the questioner is under a
serious misapprehension.
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the reduction of numerical probability to something comparative, also takes for granted
that his chosen comparative relation gives rise to incomparability.49 For explicit rejection
of Comparability for ‘confident’ (or its consequences such as Trichotomy), see Hawthorne
2009, p. 59, Schoenfield 2012, and Konek 2019.50 R. Bradley (2017) says similar things using
‘credible’ instead of ‘confident’. Kaplan (1996) develops an interesting argument against
Comparability for ‘confident’ (and thus against Credence Existence) from a premise about
preference-incompleteness—specifically, that even the preferences of an ideally rational
person who cared only for money could be incomplete.51 These authors generally focus
on the claim that the relevant failures of Comparability can arise even for rational people,
while taking it for granted such failures arise for ordinary, imperfectly rational people.52
Credence Existence places a important constraint on theorising about credence, con-
fidence, and probability, ruling out several generalisations that might otherwise seem
attractive, and which perhaps bear some of the blame for the widespread rejection of
Credence Existence. For example, the time-honoured idea that credences are correlated
with betting dispositions does not fit comfortably with Credence Existence, since one can
plausibly be confident to some degree that P while being firmly disposed to refuse all
49Koopman glosses his primitive as “p1 given p2 is no more probable than p3 given p4”, so that
(assuming the validity of double-negation elimination) the “incomparability” he endorses entails,
surprisingly, that it can be simultaneously true that p1 given p2 is more probable than p3 given p4
and that p3 given p4 is more probable than p1 given p2. While he would have done better to write
‘at least as’ rather than ‘no more than’, the slip illustrates how hard it is not to slip into assuming
Comparability even when one explicitly rejects it.
50Sturgeon (2019, §3.2) is more cautious, suggesting that ‘more confident than’ admits mul-
tiple ‘most-natural generalizations’ to states of confidence that do not involve credences, and
that counterexamples to Trichotomy arise on some, but perhaps not all, ways of resolving this
indeterminacy.
51Our argument for Descriptive Preference Completeness will clearly undermine this premise,
although even setting that argument aside, we don’t find Kaplan’s premise compelling enough to
threaten Comparability.
52Hawthorne (2009) justifies his rejection of Comparability on the grounds that ‘Real agents may
well be unable to assess their comparative confidence in some pairs of statements’. This could
be taken as an appeal to some kind of “luminosity” thesis, according to which any facts about
comparative confidence must be within the capacity of the agent to “assess”: see Williamson 2000
for general reasons to be suspicious of such theses.
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offers to buy and sell bets on whether P.53 Another view that is in tension with Credence
Existence takes credences to be or entail probability judgments:
Credences as Judgments a has credence x that P only if a judges that the prob-
ability that P is x.54
Whatever sense of ‘probability’ might be in question, Credences as Judgments is prima
facie in tension with Credence Existence, since it seems rare for people to make such
specific judgments about the value of any real-valued quantity whatsoever.55 The ten-
sion remains when we replace ‘judge’ in these biconditionals with other attitude-type
expressions like ‘believe’, ‘take’, ‘regard’, ‘find’. And it applies whether we are thinking
of the principles as elucidating credence in terms of some antecedently understood sense
of ‘probability’, or as elucidating some sense of ‘probability’ in terms of an antecedently
understood notion of credence.56
53de Finetti (1937) defines credences in terms of betting dispositions. Walley (1991) endorses a
view on which betting dispositions are necessary but not sufficient for credences, which would be
sufficient to generate the tension with Credence Existence.
54Talk of “probability judgments” is pervasive in the literature on “imprecise probability”: e.g.
Levi (1974) says his “chief concern is to argue that rational men should sometimes avoid adopting
numerically precise probability judgments”. It is unclear to us whether authors like Levi are
implicitly accepting Credences as Judgments, or are simply not talking about credence in our
sense.
55This principle has an analogue for comparative confidence:
Comparative Confidence as Judgment a is more confident that P than that Q if and only
if a judges that it is more probable that P than that Q.
Assumptions structurally like this are frequent in the literature on comparative confidence. For
example, Konek 2019 uses ‘opinion’ and ‘plausible’ instead of ‘judge’ and ‘probable’: ‘Often
I simply lack an opinion about which of two propositions is more plausible. I am not more
confident that copper will be greater than £2/lb in 2025. . . than I am that nickel will be greater
than £3/lb in 2025. . . . Neither am I less confident. . . , nor equally confident. I simply lack an
opinion on the matter.’ Cariani, Santorio, and Wellwood (MS) defend the surprising combination
of Comparability with a variant of Comparative Confidence as Judgment using ‘believe’ instead
of ‘judge’ and ‘likely’ instead of ‘probable’.
56For the former attitude, see Holton 2014. The latter way of thinking about claims like Credences
as Judgments, which is pervasive in the literature on credence, can be seen as a kind of expressivism
about (the relevant sense of) ‘probability’, by analogy with the view that equates judging that
lying is wrong with disapproving of lying, and takes this as an elucidation of ‘wrong’ rather than
of ‘disapprove’. For recent defences, and compositional semantic implementations, see Cariani,
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8 Conclusion
Many questions of philosophical interest—questions about goodness, probability, confid-
ence, preference, inequality, beauty, the strength of reasons, and so on—are posed using
familiar, natural-language gradable adjectives and other comparative expressions. Our
arguments, if they work, show that such expressions must satisfy Comparability. They
do not, of course, show that relations that violate Comparability are uninteresting or
theoretically unimportant. If you find our arguments convincing but were antecedently
disposed to reject Comparability for some particular philosophically important term, you
might be inclined to say “So much the worse for natural language”. If you have in mind
some specific definition of a technical use of the relevant term which could in principle
be used to simply eliminate all uses of it, well and good: just be sure that your choice of
this familiar-sounding way of expressing yourself doesn’t mislead readers by encouraging
them to conflate your technical sense with the ordinary sense. (You can stipulate a sense of
’knowledge’ that means ’true belief’ if you like, but doing so certainly risks confusion.) If
you don’t have such a definition up your sleeve, you might be tempted to continue theor-
izing anyway: after all, novel theoretical terms can often be introduced in science without
the help of explicit definitions (Lewis 1970), and perhaps philosophy shouldn’t be any
different. But when it comes to particular gradable adjectives such as ‘good’, ‘confident’,
‘probable’, and other gradable expressions of interest to ethics, epistemology, and other
areas of philosophy, the difficulty of this path should not be underestimated. Once the
ordinary meanings of the expressions are set aside, it is far from clear that the theoretical
role that remains will be anywhere near rich enough to pin down their meanings, and that
Santorio, and Wellwood MS, Moss 2016, Rothschild 2012, Swanson 2016, Yalcin 2012. Most focus
on ‘probably’, but Swanson explicitly considers operators of the form ‘there is an x% chance that’.
Rothschild and Moss appeal to states like being such that every member of one’s representor maps P to
some number greater than 0.5 rather than having a credence in P that is greater than 0.5; this avoids the
worry that the account requires us to hold implausibly specific judgments about probability, at the
cost of making it far less clear that we have any independent grip on the relevant mental states
other than as patterns of judgment about probability.
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we can rely on intuitive judgments about their application as freely as some philosophers
do.
Be that as it may, the original meanings of the relevant expressions are also philosoph-
ically interesting. And there is a big disadvantage of hijacking the words and investing
them with some technical sense: one will then be left without a natural way to discuss
important and philosophically central questions about goodness, probability, confidence,
preference, inequality, beauty, the strength of reasons, and other such topics. Those, at
any rate, are the questions that most interest us, and Comparability tells us something
important about them.
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